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Cited by 566Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesNonprofit Sector and VolunteeringDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign

Open access
List, John A., Lucking‐Reiley, David·2002·Journal of Political Economy
DOI 10.1086/324392
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Abstract

We design a field experiment to test two theories of fund‐raising for threshold public goods: Andreoni predicts that publicly announced “seed money” will increase charitable donations, whereas Bagnoli and Lipman predict a similar increase for a refund policy. Experimentally manipulating a solicitation of 3,000 households for a university capital campaign produced data confirming both predictions. Increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a nearly sixfold increase in contributions, with significant effects on both participation rates and average gift size. Imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20 percent, with significant effects on average gift size.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

A randomized direct-mail field experiment in a University of Central Florida capital campaign finds that higher seed money sharply increases charitable giving, while refunds have a smaller positive effect mainly on gift size. The results support the main comparative-static predictions of Andreoni (1998) on seed money and Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) on refunds, but also reveal patterns not explained by those theories.

Key findings

  • Seed money increased total contributions: moving from 10% to 67% seed money raised total contributions by 560%, with the two 10% treatments yielding $581 combined versus $3,260 for the two 67% treatments.
  • Participation rose monotonically with seed money: from 3.7% at 10% seed to 6.4% at 33% and 8.2% at 67%; mean gifts also rose from $15.42 to $26.12 to $39.87, respectively.
  • Refunds had no significant effect on participation but a positive aggregate effect on mean gift size (combined t = 2.23, p = .026); refunds increased total contributions by only 21%, versus the more-than-fivefold seed-money effect.
  • Across all six treatments, 183 donations totaled $5,509; after refunds in two failed refund treatments (10R and 33R), the gain to CEPA was $4,267, and no-refund treatments produced more usable capital ($2,492) than refund treatments ($1,775).

Methods

  • Field experiment embedded in a real capital campaign for a new Center for Environmental Policy Analysis (CEPA) computer purchase; 3,000 central Florida residents with income above $70,000 and prior charitable giving were randomly assigned to six groups of 500.
  • Treatments varied seed money (10%, 33%, or 67% of the $3,000 computer cost) and refund policy (refund vs. no refund), yielding treatments 10, 10R, 33, 33R, 67, and 67R; solicitation letters were identical except for the seed amount and refund sentence.
  • Letters were mailed November 29–December 3, 1999, with responses requested by December 31, 1999; analysis used descriptive statistics and z/t tests, including an aggregate test of the three independent refund t-statistics.

Limitations

  • Stated: field experiments are not as “clean” as laboratory experiments, and the mathematical assumptions of the theories cannot necessarily be guaranteed to hold; the study did not include a zero-seed treatment, so the optimal seed amount remains an open empirical question.
  • Stated: the experiment did not vary policies for contributions in excess of the threshold, and it was not designed to test Pecorino and Temimi’s refund theory directly.
  • Evident from the text: the sample is limited to one charity campaign, one region, and high-income prior donors; response rates were low (3.4%–8.4%), treatment-level donation samples were small (17–42), and the authors note uncertainty about whether results would generalize to very large seed amounts or to zero seed money.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/324392

Cites

24 of 24 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

3 of 35 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    The refund variable appears to have a positive effect on gift size.

    “However, the refund variable does seem to have a positive effect on gift size.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § A. Effects of Seed Money

    The number of large gifts over $20 increased from 13 to 36 to 69 as seed money increased.

    “the number of large gifts (over $20 each) increases tremendously, from 13 to 36 to 69, as the amount of seed money increases from one treatment to the next.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § III. Results

    Total contributions increase monotonically with seed money across treatments.

    “The total amount of contributions monotonically increases as we move from left to right across the columns of the table.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    In aggregate, the refund variable has a positive, statistically significant effect on mean gift size.

    “in aggregate, the refund variable does have a positive, statistically significant effect on the mean gift size.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    The refund treatment does not appear to affect donor participation rate.

    “The refund treatment variable does not appear to affect donors' participation rate.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 30
  • May combine two claims. 26
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 5

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § II. Experimental Design

    Field experiments can create exogenous variation in variables of interest, allowing novel tests of economic theory.

    “field experiments represent an exciting opportunity to test the validity and relevance of the predictions of economic theory.In contrast to traditional field studies, we can create exogenous variation in the variables of interest, allowing for novel tests of economic theory.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Lucking-Reiley 1999 source
    • cites List and Lucking-Reiley 2000 source
    • cites List 2001 source

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § A. Seed Money

    An aggregate test of the refund effect on participation rate yields no statistical significance (z=0.008).

    “an aggregate test statistic for the effect of the refund variable on the participation rate yields no statistical significance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    At 10% seed, refund treatment had slightly higher participation than no-refund (4.0% vs 3.4%), but the direction reversed at higher seed levels.

    “At the 10 percent seed level, the refund treatment generates a slightly higher participation rate than the no-refund treatment (4.0 percent vs. 3.4 percent), but the direction of this effect is reversed at the higher seed levels.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § III. Results

    Seed money increases total contributions more than fivefold, while refunds increase them by 21%.

    “Whereas seed money increases total contributions more than fivefold, refunds increase total contributions by only 21 percent.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § A. Effects of Seed Money

    Mean donation at 33% seed is $26.12, significantly higher than at 10% (t=3.27, p=.001).

    “At the 33 percent seed level, the average amount contributed increases to $26.12, a statistically significant difference”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § III. Results

    The refund effect had the same direction at all three seed levels but a smaller magnitude than the seed effect.

    “The direction of the effect was the same at all three levels of seed money, though the magnitude of the refund effect is considerably smaller than the magnitude of the seed money effect.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § III. Results

    The refund policy increases total contributions, though less than seed money.

    “To a lesser extent, the use of a refund policy also increases the total contributions”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    At 67% seed, refund increased mean contribution by $9.02, not statistically significant (t=1.37, p=.171).

    “an increase of $9.02 at the 67 percent seed level”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § A. Effects of Seed Money

    Both participation rate and average gift size clearly increase with seed money.

    “We find it remarkable that both the participation rate and the average gift size are clearly increasing in the level of seed money.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § A. Effects of Seed Money

    The 33% seed participation rate is intermediate at 6.4%, making participation appear monotonic in seed money.

    “The participation rate for the 33 percent seed level is intermediate, at 6.4 percent, making the donors' participation rate appear monotonic in the level of seed money.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § A. Effects of Seed Money

    There were 21 small gifts under $10 at 10% seed, 19 at 33%, and six at 67%.

    “Though there were 21 small gifts (under $10 each) at the 10 percent seed level and 19 such gifts at the 33 percent seed level, there were only six small gifts at the 67 percent seed level.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § I. Introduction

    Increased seed money sharply raises both donor participation and average gift size.

    “We show that increased seed money sharply increases both the participation rate of donors and the average gift size received from participating donors.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § I. Introduction

    Refunds have a small positive effect on gift size but no effect on participation.

    “we find that refunds have a small, positive effect on the gift size but no effect on the participation rate.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § A. Seed Money

    In the field experiment, total contributions rose as the amount of seed money increased, and the rise was continuous across the 10%, 33%, and 67% seed levels.

    “A related puzzle is that observed contributions appear to increase continuously in the amount of seed money.”
    • Also stated in: § A. Seed Money · plain
      “the experiment shows levels of giving rising continuously as the seed money rises from 10 percent to 33 percent to 67 percent.”
    • Also stated in: § V. Conclusions · plain
      “We find that total contributions increase with the amount of seed money available, as predicted by Andreoni (1998).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    At 10% seed, adding a refund increased average gift size from $11.88 to $18.95, significant at the 10% level (t=1.83, p=.068).

    “introducing a refund increases the average gift size by more than half, from $11.88 to $18.95.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § A. Seed Money

    Average total contributions were $291 with a $300 seed, $834 with a $1,000 seed, and $1,630 with a $2,000 seed.

    “we find average total contributions to be $291 with a $300 seed, $834 with a $1,000 seed, and $1,630 with a $2,000 seed.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingown data
    § III. Results

    The six fund-raisers raised $5,509 in donation checks.

    “In all, the six fund-raisers brought in a total of $5,509 in donation checks.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § III. Results

    The two 10% treatments combined raised $581, while the two 67% treatments combined raised $3,260.

    “The two 10 percent treatments yielded a combined total of only $581, whereas the two 67 percent treatments yielded a combined total of $3,260.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § B. Refund Policy

    At 33% seed, refund increased mean contribution by $3.44, not statistically significant (t=0.66, p=.512).

    “an increase of $3.44 in the mean contribution at the 33 percent seed level”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § B. Refunds

    Total capital raised in the refund treatments was $1,775, while the three no-refund treatments raised $2,492.

    “the total capital raised in the refund treatments was $1,775, compared with $2,492 in the three no-refund treatments.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    Seed money commitments can remove the zero-giving equilibrium by reducing the amount still to be raised.

    “The zero-contribution equilibrium can be eliminated, however, by initial commitments of seed money, which lower the remaining amount to be raised in the public fund-raising campaign.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    A fund-raising manual advises not beginning a campaign's public phase until 40-50% of the goal is pledged as seed money.

    “a recent manual for fund-raisers recommends not starting the public phase of a fund-raising campaign until”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Fundraising School 1999

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    Bagnoli and McKee experimentally confirmed that a refund mechanism produces efficient public-good provision.

    “Bagnoli and McKee (1991) experimentally confirmed the prediction of Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) that a refund mechanism does produce efficient public-good provision.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bagnoli and McKee (1991) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    Andreoni's theory implies that publicly announced seed contributions can raise total giving to a capital campaign.

    “One testable implication of the theory is that publicly announced seed contributions can increase the total amount of giving to a capital campaign.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    In threshold public-good games, free-riding equilibria can fail to provide the good, but a refund policy can facilitate the efficient equilibrium.

    “there exist inefficient, free-riding equilibria that fail to provide the public good, but a refund policy can make it easier to achieve the efficient equilibrium in which the good is provided.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § I. Introduction

    Before this study, no quantitative measurement of seed money's role had been documented.

    “we have not been able to find documentation of a single quantitative measurement of the role of seed money.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    Cadsby and Maynes found the refund effect is larger when the threshold is relatively high.

    “Cadsby and Maynes (1999) show that this effect is larger when the threshold is relatively high.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cadsby and Maynes (1999) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § I. Introduction

    Bagnoli and Lipman proposed refunding all contributions if the threshold is not met.

    “They propose a fund-raising strategy that refunds all money to contributors if the threshold is not reached.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni's theory predicts a move from zero participation to a positive equilibrium participation level, but it does not predict that contributors would increase their gift sizes.

    “A third puzzle is that while Andreoni's theory predicts an increase from zero participation to some positive equilibrium amount of participation, it does not predict an increase in gift size by those contributing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Study design and conductown data
    § II. Experimental Design

    The solicitation letter text was identical across treatments except for the manipulated variables.

    “The text of the solicitation letter was completely identical across treatments, except for the variables that changed from one treatment to another.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning
    § II. Experimental Design

    Field experiments check robustness of laboratory results in natural settings where mathematical assumptions may not hold.

    “They check the robustness of laboratory results in a natural setting, where the mathematical assumptions of the theory cannot necessarily be guaranteed to hold.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni predicts seed money may raise public-good provision from zero to a positive equilibrium at or above the threshold.

    “He predicts that seed money may increase the amount of public-good provision in a charitable fund-raiser from zero to some positive equilibrium level * G (greater than or equal to the threshold level).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni's theory indicates a critical seed level above which the zero equilibrium ceases and only a positive equilibrium remains.

    “The theory indicates that there exists a critical level of seed money t above which the equilibrium at zero ceases to exist, and only the equilibrium at remains.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In Andreoni's model, the zero-contribution equilibrium exists only if the minimum threshold for public-good provision exceeds the largest individual gift in a nonzero equilibrium.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § A. Seed Money

    If seed money works by removing the zero-giving equilibrium, then it should not matter when a refund is offered, since a refund already rules out that equilibrium.

    “If this were the case, then seed money should be irrelevant in the presence of a refund (which itself rules out the zero-giving equilibrium).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation
    § III. Results

    The refund result is consistent with Bagnoli and Lipman.

    “consistent with Bagnoli and Lipman (1989).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § A. Seed Money

    If donors could perfectly forecast the total amount given, they would give nothing in the 10% seed treatment, because actual contributions there reached only 20% of the $3,000 goal.

    “Note, for example, that if agents were able to forecast perfectly the total amount given, they would not give at all in the 10 percent seed money treatment, because total contributions fell well short (only 20 percent) of the $3,000 goal.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Vesterlund (1999) models donors as uncertain about charity quality and shows that seed contributions can signal quality to later donors.

    “She models donors as being uncertain about the quality of the charity and shows that seed contributions may serve as signals of quality to later donors.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Vesterlund (1999)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni proposes that seed money raises contributions by removing the risk of a zero-giving equilibrium.

    “Andreoni proposes that seed money influences contributions by eliminating the danger of a zero-giving equilibrium.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § B. Refunds

    The expected optimum is either between 33% and 67% or above 67%.

    “We should therefore expect the optimum to be either between 33 percent and 67 percent or above 67 percent.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The optimality discussion assumes that other people, not the fund-raiser, provide the seed money.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § I. Introduction

    This is the first study to examine seed money or refunds in a real charitable campaign.

    “To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the effects of seed money or refunds in a real charitable giving campaign.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § I. Introduction

    Laboratory experiments impose all underlying theoretical assumptions, such as complete information about utility functions.

    “In laboratory experiments, the experimental design imposes all the underlying assumptions of the theory, for example, that subjects have complete information about everyone's utility functions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni's model correctly predicts that seed money raises contributions, but it may give the wrong reason for that effect.

    “Though Andreoni's model correctly predicts the positive effect of seed money on contributions, it may be proposing the wrong explanation for this effect.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    At that critical seed level, the theory predicts a discrete increase from zero to at least the $3,000 threshold.

    “at the critical level of seed money t, there should be a discrete increase in public-good provision from zero to some amount greater than or equal to the $3,000 threshold level.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source
    • The authors state this as an assumption: In Andreoni's model, the zero-contribution equilibrium exists only if the minimum threshold for public-good provision exceeds the largest individual gift in a nonzero equilibrium.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Andreoni's theory, read literally, implies that contributions in this experiment would shift discontinuously from a zero equilibrium to an equilibrium of at least $3,000.

    “Andreoni's theory, if taken literally, predicts that contributions in our experiment should jump discretely from an equilibrium of zero to an equilibrium of at least $3,000”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Andreoni (1998) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Cooper and Stockman show that in sequential public-good games, subjects may not give even when giving is dominant, if earlier players failed to give, apparently for fairness reasons.

    “Cooper and Stockman (2001) demonstrate that in sequential publicgood games, subjects may decide not to give, even when it is a dominant strategy to do so, when previous players have failed to give, apparently because of fairness considerations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Cooper and Stockman (2001)

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § A. Seed Money

    Pecorino and Temimi also observe that seed money may be useful in practice to cover the administrative costs of processing refunds.

    “However, they also observe that seed money might be useful in practice for covering the administrative costs of processing a refund.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pecorino and Temimi (2001) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § V. Conclusions

    If the seed proportion approached 100%, the response would become backward-bending, with contributions eventually falling as seed money rose.

    “If the seed proportion approached 100 percent, we would expect the response to become backward-bending, with contributions eventually becoming lower as the amount of seed money increased.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data
    § B. Refunds

    The experiment was not designed to test Pecorino and Temimi's theory directly because it had no zero-seed-money treatment.

    “(Admittedly, our experiment was not designed to test their theory directly, since we do not include a treatment with zero seed money.)”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Pecorino and Temimi (2001) source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Study design and conductown data
    § V. Conclusions

    Using a t distribution instead of a standard normal distribution would change the reported p-value from .068 to .072.

    “using the t distribution would change the p-value reported above from .068 to .072.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § V. Conclusions

    Menezes, Monteiro, and Temimi (2001) show that refunds produce more efficient outcomes, raise the probability of reaching the threshold, and have stronger effects under incomplete information than under complete information.

    “They show that refunds produce more efficient outcomes, with higher probabilities of reaching the threshold, and that the effects of a refund are in some sense stronger in a model of incomplete information than in a model of complete information.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Menezes, Monteiro, and Temimi (2001) source
50 of 50

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    In Andreoni's model, the zero-contribution equilibrium exists only if the minimum threshold for public-good provision exceeds the largest individual gift in a nonzero equilibrium.

    “Existence of the equilibrium at zero requires another assumption: that the minimum threshold for public-good provision exceeds the amount of the largest individual gift in a nonzero equilibrium.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The optimality discussion assumes that other people, not the fund-raiser, provide the seed money.

    “Note that this optimality discussion assumes that others donate the seed money.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The alternative use of nonrefunded donations is less valuable than the computer being solicited for, but better than burning or returning the money.

    “One might presume this alternative use to be less valuable than that of the computer for which we specifically solicited funds, but one might also presume that it is a considerably better outcome than burning the money (or returning it to the laboratory experimenter).”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Other real-world charities may also put nonrefunded donations to some other use if the threshold is not met.

    “Perhaps this is a realistic assumption for other real-world charities as well, since they might try again to meet the threshold in a later round of fund-raising advertised to a new set of donors.”
4 of 4

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Cooper David J, 2001, Manuscript. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve Univ.
  2. The Fundraising School, 1999, Principles and Techniques of Fundraising. Indianapolis: Indiana Univ.–Purdue Univ
  3. Harbaugh William T, 1998, A.E.R. Papers and Proc., 88, 277
  4. List John A, 2000, A.E.R., 90, 961
  5. Lucking‐Reiley David, 1999, A.E.R., 89, 1063
  6. Mixer Joseph R, 1993, Principles of Successful Fundraising: Useful Foundations for Successful Practice
  7. Vesterlund Lise, 1999, Manuscript. Ames: Iowa State Univ.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
List, J. A., & Lucking‐Reiley, D.
Affiliations
  • University of Maryland, College Park (US)
  • University of Arizona (US)
ORCID
List, John A.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
2002-02
Volume
110
Issue
1
Pages
215-233
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/324392
OpenAlex
W2194211767
Cited by
560
References
22
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 39 · 2020: 38 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 26 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 36 · 2012: 29
FWCI
48.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
seed money, refund policy, charitable giving, threshold public goods, gift size, fundraising, public goods

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Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-07.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-07.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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