The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets
Abstract
We present a dynamic model of adverse selection to examine the interactions between new and used goods markets. We find that the used market never shuts down, the volume of trade can be large, and distortions are lower than previously thought. New cars prices can be higher under adverse selection than in its absence. An extension to several brands that differ in reliability leads to testable predictions of the effects of adverse selection. Unreliable brands have steeper price declines and lower volumes of trade. We contrast these predictions with those of a model where brands physically depreciate at different rates. (JEL D82, L15)
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.i · Cited by 6,810
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.6.1.58 · Cited by 5,920
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
Grossman, S. J. (1981) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466995 · Cited by 2,483
Adverse Selection in the Labor Market
Greenwald, B. C. N. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429023507 · Cited by 441
Adverse Selection in the Labour Market
Greenwald, B. C. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297632 · Cited by 357
The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection
Wilson, C. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003403 · Cited by 275
Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
Samuelson, W. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911195 · Cited by 252
Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market
Genesove, D. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261891 · Cited by 241
A direct test of the 'lemons' model: the market for used pickup trucks
Bond, E. W. W. (2002) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/1843760258.00023 · Cited by 153
Cited by
On Product Uncertainty in Online Markets: Theory and Evidence1
Dimoka, A., Hong, Y., & Pavlou, P. A. (2012) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/41703461 · Cited by 682
Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets
Eisfeldt, A. L. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00625.x · Cited by 367
Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets
Waldman, M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164985 · Cited by 316
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
Tirole, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.29 · Cited by 263
Notheisen, B., Cholewa, J. B., & Shanmugam, A. P. (2017) · Business & Information Systems Engineering · doi:10.1007/s12599-017-0499-8 · Cited by 215
Metadata
- Authors
- Hendel, I., & Lizzeri, A.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-12-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1097-1115
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122408502
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 12.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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