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Cited by 362

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination

Mitra, Devashish·1999·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
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Abstract

This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13)

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Cites

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Metadata

Authors
Mitra, D.
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
1999-12-01
Volume
89
Issue
5
Pages
1116-1134
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
OpenAlex
W2008026708
Cited by
362
References
24
FWCI
24.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.89.5.1116
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Mitra, D. (1999). Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1116

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.