The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination
Abstract
This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
(2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.i · Cited by 8,043
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118470 · Cited by 4,406
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
The Rise and Decline of Nations.
Beckerman, W., & Olson, M. (1983) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2232759 · Cited by 2,792
(2019) · Eastern Economic Journal · doi:10.1057/41302.1939-4632 · Cited by 2,707
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Bernheim, B. D., Peleg, B., & Whinston, M. D. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8 · Cited by 1,036
Mayer, W. (1984) · American Economic Review · Cited by 682
The theory of international environmental agreementsPreprint
Barrett, S. A. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 638
The Political Economy of Protection
Hillman, A. L. (2013) · Taylor & Francis eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315014609 · Cited by 453
(2017) · West Virginia Politics and Government, Second Edition · doi:10.2307/j.ctt1dfntx8.8 · Cited by 409
(2018) · The Essence of Politics · doi:10.1017/9789048544738.003 · Cited by 317
Regionalism versus Multilateralism
Bhagwati, J. (1992) · The World Economy · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.1992.tb00536.x · Cited by 276
External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia
Sachs, J. D., & Williamson, J. (1985) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534445 · Cited by 226
External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in Latin America and East Asia
Sachs, J. D. (2018) · Modern Political Economy and Latin America · doi:10.4324/9780429498893-27 · Cited by 224
King Kong Meets Godzilla: The World Bank and The East Asian MiraclePreprint
Rodrik, D. (1994) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 207
Canzoneri, M. B., Ethier, W. J., & Grilli, V. (1996) · Cited by 187
Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy
Rodrik, D. (1986) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/0022-1996(86)90041-3 · Cited by 174
THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs*
Findlay, R. E. (1990) · Economics and Politics · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00030.x · Cited by 102
Politics, process, and American trade policy
O’Halloran, S. (1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-4762 · Cited by 89
Cited by
Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection
Gawande, K., & Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465300558579 · Cited by 513
Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation
Bombardini, M. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.03.003 · Cited by 310
Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence
Fredriksson, P. G., Vollebergh, H. R. J., & Dijkgraaf, E. (2004) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001 · Cited by 310
Big data’s impact on privacy, security and consumer welfare
Kshetri, N. (2014) · Telecommunications Policy · doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2014.10.002 · Cited by 300
Bagwell, K., Bown, C. P., & Staiger, R. W. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20151192 · Cited by 122
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitra, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-12-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1116-1134
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008026708
- Cited by
- 362
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 24.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.