CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 171Auction Theory and ApplicationsExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEconomic and Environmental Valuation

Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment

Open access
List, John A, Lucking-Reiley, David·2000·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.90.4.961
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment by John A. List and David Lucking-Reiley. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 961-972 of American Economic Review, September 2000

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/aer.90.4.961

Cites

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Field experiments can create exogenous variation in variables of interest, allowing novel tests of economic theory.

    “field experiments represent an exciting opportunity to test the validity and relevance of the predictions of economic theory.In contrast to traditional field studies, we can create exogenous variation in the variables of interest, allowing for novel tests of economic theory.”

    From The Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence from a University Capital Campaign (2002) · cites this paper as List and Lucking-Reiley 2000

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

No references could be resolved yet.

Research works printed but not linked: 23

  1. Alsemgeest, Paul; Noussair, Charles and Olson, Mark. "Experimental Comparisons of Auc- tions under Single-and Multi-Unit Demand." Economic Inquiry, January 1998, 36(1), pp. 87-97.
  2. Cason, Timothy N. and Plott, Charles R. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Lab- oratory Evaluation." Journal of Environmen- tal Economics and Management, March 1996, 30(2), pp. 133-60.
  3. Clarke, Edward H. "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods." Public Choice, Fall 1971, 11, pp. 17-33.
  4. Conlisk, John. "Why Bounded Rationality?" Journal of Economic Literature, June 1996, 34(2), pp. 669-700.
  5. Cox, James C.; Smith, Vernon L. and James M. Walker. "Theory and Behavior of Multiple Unit Discriminative Auctions." Journal of Finance, September 1984, 39(4), pp. 983-1010. ."Expected Revenue in Discriminative and Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auctions," in Vernon L. Smith, ed., Research in experi- mental economics, Vol. 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985, pp. 183-232.
  6. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard and Kahn, Charles M. "Multi-Unit Auctions with Uni- form Prices." Economic Theory, September 1998, 12(2), pp. 227-58.
  7. Groves, Theodore. "Incentives in Teams." Econometrica, July 1973, 41(4), pp. 617-31.
  8. Kagel, John H.; Harstad, Ronald M. and Levin, Dan. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study." Econometrica, November 1987, 55(6), pp. 1275-304.
  9. Kagel, John H., and Levin, Dan. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior in First-, Second-, and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders." Eco- nomic Journal, July 1993, 103(419), pp. 868-79. . "Behavior in Multi-Unit-Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform-Price and Dynamic Auctions." Econometrica, 2000 (forthcoming).
  10. Ledyard, John 0.; Porter, I)avid and Rangel, A. "Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Fall 1997, 6(3), pp. 639-75.
  11. List, John A.; Margolis, M. and Shogren, Jason F. "Hypothetical-Actual Bid Calibration of a Multi-Good Auction." Economics Letters, September 1998, 60(3), pp. 263-68.
  12. List, John A. and Shogren, Jason F. "Experimen- tal Calibration of the Difference between Ac- tual and Hypothetical Reported Valuations," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organi- zation, October 1998a, 37(2), pp. 193-205. . "The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment," American Economic Review, De- cember 1998b, 88(5), pp. 1350-55.
  13. Lucking-Reiley, David. "Using Field Experi- ments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet." American Economic Review, December 1999, 89(5), pp. 1063-80. _ . "Magic on the Internet: Evidence from Field Experiments on Reserve Prices in Auc- tions." Working Paper, Vanderbilt Univer- sity, 1999b.
  14. McCabe, Kevin A.; Rassenti, Stephen J. and Smith, Vernon L. "Auction Institutional Design: The- oty and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple- Unit Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions." American Economic Review, De- cember 1990, 80(5), pp. 1276-83. "Testing Vickrey's and Other Simul- taneous Multiple Unit Versions of the English Auction," in Vernon L. Smith, ed., Research in experimental economics, Vol.
  15. Miller, Gary J. and Plott, Charles R. "Revenue Generating Properties of Sealed-Bid Auc- tions: An Experimental Analysis of One- Price and Discriminative Processes," in Vernon L. Smith, ed., Research in experi- mental economics, Vol. 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985, pp. 159-81.
  16. Noussair, Charles. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands." Economic Theory, 1995, 5(2), pp. 337-51.
  17. Plott, Charles R. "Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction." Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Fall 1997, 6(3), pp. 605-38.
  18. Slonim, Robert and Roth, Alvin E. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experi- ment in the Slovak Republic." Econometrica, May 1998, 66(3), pp. 569-96.
  19. Smith, Vernon L. and Walker, James M. "Mon- etary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experi- mental Economics." Economic Inquiry, April 1993, 31(2), pp. 245-61.
  20. Tenorio, Rafael. "Revenue Equivalence and Bid- ding Behavior in a Multi-Unit Auction Mar- ket: An Empirical Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1993, 75(2), pp. 302-14.
  21. Umlauf, Steven R. "An Empirical Study of the Mexican Treasury Bill Auction." Journal of Financial Economics, June 1993, 33(3), pp. 313-240.
  22. Vickrey, William. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders." Journal of Finance, 16(1), March 1961, pp. 8-37.
  23. Wolfram, Catherine D. "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales." Rand Journal of Economics, Winter 1998, 29(4), pp. 703-25.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
List, J. A., & Lucking-Reiley, D.
Affiliations
  • University of Central Florida (US)
  • Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235.
ORCID
List, John A
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2000-09-01
Volume
90
Issue
4
Pages
961-972
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.90.4.961
OpenAlex
W4246157496
Cited by
171
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 4
FWCI
11.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research (submittedVersion)
Funders
National Science Foundation (9811273)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Environmental Valuation
Keywords
demand reduction, multi-unit auctions, field experiments, auction design, bidding behavior

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review