The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation
Abstract
We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes. (JEL O11, P16, P51)
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Part of the visually striking association between high historical density of conflict events and high present vulnerability denotes causal pathways from underdevelopment to conflict and from conflict to developmental stagnation.
“part of the visually striking association also denotes causal pathways from underdevelopment to conflict as well as from conflict to developmental stagnation.”
From Vicious Circles: Violence, Vulnerability, and Climate Change (2021) · cites this paper as [169]
The germ theory emphasises the life expectancy of Europeans in harsh tropical environments and suggests that extractive institutions including land grab and coercive labour regimes were more likely to persist in regions where Europeans did not settle in large numbers because of uncongenial geographical conditions.
“The second explanatory model, the «germ theory», emphasises the life expectancy of the Europeans in harsh tropical environments and suggests that «extractive» institutions including land grab and coercive labour regimes were more likely to persist in regions where Europeans did not settle in large numbers because of uncongenial geographical conditions (Acemoglu et al. 2001).”
From THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF INDIA (1858-1947) (2016) · cites this paper as Acemoglu et al. 2001
European colonial powers were more likely to establish long-lasting democratic political systems and economic institutions in regions with lower incidences of infectious diseases.
“European colonial powers were more likely to establish long-lasting democratic political systems and economic institutions in regions characterized by lower incidences of infectious diseases [31], [32].”
From Pathogens and Politics: Further Evidence That Parasite Prevalence Predicts Authoritarianism (2013) · cites this paper as [31]
These results do not challenge the important role of colonial history in explaining contemporary nation-level differences in political and economic outcomes; they simply indicate that a colonial-spread-of-institutions process cannot provide a complete explanation for the relation between parasite prevalence and authoritarianism.
“These results do not challenge the important role of colonial history in explaining contemporary nation-level differences in political and economic outcomes [31], [32]. The results simply indicate that a colonial-spread-of-institutions process cannot provide a complete explanation for the relation between parasite prevalence and authoritarianism.”
From Pathogens and Politics: Further Evidence That Parasite Prevalence Predicts Authoritarianism (2013) · cites this paper as [31]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 13 · Cited by 8,517
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A.
- Affiliations
- Department of Economics, E52-380b, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02319, and Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2001-12-01
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1369-1401
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124166904
- Cited by
- 8,517
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2026: 588 · 2025: 648 · 2024: 525 · 2023: 430 · 2022: 428 · 2021: 521 · 2020: 463 · 2019: 506 · 2018: 409 · 2017: 396 · 2016: 340 · 2015: 341 · 2014: 346 · 2013: 313 · 2012: 376
- FWCI
- 239.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Growth and Productivity
- Keywords
- colonial institutions, extractive institutions, colonial policy, economic development, per capita income, institutional persistence, comparative development
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
