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Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations
Open accessAbstract
A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent's output is studied. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor. For the infinite horizon. it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. Furthermore, optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short-term contracts. A family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized. Longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement. Comparative statics on the review length are carried out. Finally, these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient. (JEL D82, D86)
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Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Cited by
MANSO, G. (2011) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x · Cited by 1,955
Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities
Gibbons, R., & Henderson, R. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0715 · Cited by 537
Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement
MacLeod, W. B. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.595 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Fuchs, W.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-08-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1432-1448
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2624013452
- Cited by
- 206
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 9.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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