The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Individual Preferences for Giving
Abstract
We utilize graphical representations of Dictator Games which generate rich individual-level data. Our baseline experiment employs budget sets over feasible payoff-pairs. We test these data for consistency with utility maximization, and we recover the underlying preferences for giving (trade-offs between own payoffs and the payoffs of others). Two further experiments augment the analysis. An extensive elaboration employs three-person budget sets to distinguish preferences for giving from social preferences (trade-offs between the payoffs of others). And an intensive elaboration employs step-shaped sets to distinguish between behaviors that are compatible with well-behaved preferences and those compatible only with not well-behaved cases. (JEL C72, D64)
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Cites
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Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
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Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Camerer, C. F. (2003) · Cited by 3,722
Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00302 · Cited by 1,936
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
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Efficiency Estimation of Production Functions
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Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
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Cited by
Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field
DellaVigna, S. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.315 · Cited by 2,365
Fairness and the Development of Inequality Acceptance
Almås, I., Cappelen, A. W., Sørensen, E. Ø., & Tungodden, B. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1187300 · Cited by 448
Kimbrough, E. O., & Vostroknutov, A. (2016) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12152 · Cited by 373
Civic honesty around the globe
Cohn, A., Maréchal, M. A., Tannenbaum, D., & Zünd, C. L. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aau8712 · Cited by 322
Choi, S., Kariv, S., Müller, W., & Silverman, D. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.6.1518 · Cited by 277
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fisman, R., Kariv, S., & Markovits, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2007-12-01
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1858-1876
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2068959754
- Cited by
- 451
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 41.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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