The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Auctions and the Price of Art
Abstract
This paper contains a review of the burgeoning research that has been designed to shed light on how the art auction system actually works and what it indicates about price formation. First, we find that in recent years returns on art assets appear to be little different from returns on other assets. In addition, some researchers have found that because of the weak correlation between art asset returns with other returns, there may be a case for the inclusion of art assets in a diversified portfolio. Second, we find evidence of several anomalies in art market pricing. The evidence clearly suggests that, contrary to the view of the art trade, masterpieces underperform the market. In addition, there is considerable evidence that there are fairly long periods in which art prices may diverge across geographic areas and even auction houses. Third, we review the public record of the criminal trial of Sotheby`s former Chairman, who was accused of price fixing, to show how the collusion with Christie`s, the other great public auction house, was actually engineered. Contrary to the way the proceeds from the settlement of the civil suit in this case were distributed, we show that buyers were almost certainly not injured by the collusion, but that sellers were. In addition, based on the public record of settlement, it appears that the plaintiffs in the civil suit were very handsomely repaid for their injury. Finally, we review the extensive research on the effects of the auction institution on price formation. There is now considerable theoretical research on strategic behavior in auctions, much of it in response to empirical findings, and we review three key findings. First, the evidence suggests that art experts provide extremely accurate predictions of market prices, but that these predictions do not optimally process the publicly available information. Second, high reserve prices, and the resulting high unsold (buy-in) rates are best explained as optimal search in the face of stochastic demand. Third, extensive research has documented that the prices of identical objects are more likely to decline than to increase when multiple units are sold, and this has led to considerable theoretical research. Subsequent empirical research has tended to document declining demand prices even when the objects are imperfect substitutes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Buying Beauty: On Prices and Returns in the Art Market
Renneboog, L., & Spaenjers, C. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1580 · Cited by 372
Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art Auctions
Beggs, A., & Graddy, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.3.1027 · Cited by 294
Self-citationExperience and Brokerage in Asset Markets: Evidence from Art Auctions
Bruno, B., Garcia‐Appendini, E., & Nocera, G. (2018) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12207
Metadata
- Authors
- Ashenfelter, O., & Graddy, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2003-09
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 763-786
- ISSN
- 0022-0515 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124855144
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 59.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Auctions and the Price of Art. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/jel.41.3.763
- The paper
- Ashenfelter, O., & Graddy, K. (2003). Auctions and the Price of Art. Journal of Economic Literature. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.41.3.763
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.