The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
Open accessAbstract
The design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously; whether the government should allow bids for combinations of licenses or accept only single-license bids; how the auction should should be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms; whether the government should impose royalties or reserve prices; and how much the bidders should be informed about their competition.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Cited by
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
Binmore, K., & Klemperer, P. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00020 · Cited by 409
(1996) · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1996-02-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 159-175
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2055943083
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 51.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Analyzing the Airwaves Auction. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/jep.10.1.159
- The paper
- McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996). Analyzing the Airwaves Auction. Journal of Economic Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.1.159
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
