The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
Open accessAbstract
The design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously; whether the government should allow bids for combinations of licenses or accept only single-license bids; how the auction should should be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms; whether the government should impose royalties or reserve prices; and how much the bidders should be informed about their competition.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationMenu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
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Self-citationHow Auctions Work for Wine and Art
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Government procurement and international trade
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Self-citationCompetitive Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities
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Cited by
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157061 · Cited by 1,568
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
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Metadata
- Authors
- McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1996-02-01
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 159-175
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2055943083
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 51.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.