The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions
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[Joseph Stiglitz was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1993–95, and chairman of the CEA from 1995 through February 1997.] Today, I want to share with you some of my thoughts about the possibilities and limitations of government. These thoughts are focused around a simple question: Why is it so difficult to implement even Pareto improvements? Working in Washington, I quickly saw that although a few potential changes were strictly Pareto improvements, there were many other changes that would hurt only a small, narrowly defined group (for example, increasing the efficiency of the legal system might hurt lawyers). But if everyone except a narrowly defined special interest group could be shown to benefit, surely the change should be made. In practice, however, “almost everyone” was rarely sufficient in government policy-making and often such near-Pareto improvements did not occur. My major theme will be to provide a set of explanations for why this might be so. I shall put forward four hypotheses in this lecture, each of which provides part of the explanation for the failure in at least one instance of a proposed Pareto improvement. These hypotheses, like much of the literature on government failures, focus on the role of incentives: how misaligned incentives can induce government officials to take actions that are not, in any sense, in the public interest.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stiglitz, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1998-05-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 3-22
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163891429
- Cited by
- 324
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 24.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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