The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis
Open accessAbstract
Many observers have argued that credit default swaps contributed significantly to the credit crisis. Of particular concern to these observers are that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated over-the-counter market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they facilitate speculation involving negative views of a firm's financial strength. Some observers have suggested that credit default swaps would not have made the crisis worse had they traded on exchanges. I conclude that credit default swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis, that the over-the-counter credit default swaps market worked well during much of the crisis, and that exchange trading has both advantages and costs compared to over-the-counter trading. Though I argue that eliminating over-the-counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare, I also recognize that much research is needed to understand better and to quantify the social gains and costs of derivatives in general and credit default swaps in particular.
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Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market
LONGSTAFF, F. A., MITHAL, S., & NEIS, E. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00797.x · Cited by 2,087
Constraints on short-selling and asset price adjustment to private information
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90042-0 · Cited by 1,919
Liquidity and Market Structure
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Bank Competition and Financial Stability
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Insider trading in credit derivatives☆
ACHARYA, V, & JOHNSON, T. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.05.003 · Cited by 825
Maris, B. A. (2006) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v36.n1.1812 · Cited by 629
Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?
Duffie, D., & Zhu, H. (2011) · Review of Asset Pricing Studies · doi:10.1093/rapstu/rar001 · Cited by 597
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Cited by
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation
Irani, R. M., Iyer, R., Meisenzahl, R. R., & Peydró, J.-L. (2021) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhaa106 · Cited by 339
Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s
White, E. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15573 · Cited by 110
Metadata
- Authors
- Stulz, R. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-02-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 73-92
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3022773787
- Cited by
- 494
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 75.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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