The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision
Abstract
Economic theory suggests that bankruptcy should serve as a screening process designed to eliminate only those firms that are economically inefficient and whose resources could be better used in some other activity. However, firms typically file for bankruptcy voluntarily. When they do, creditors are not all repaid in full and large redistributional effects occur. Managers of firms do not take creditors' losses fully into account in deciding either how to run the firm or whether and when to file for bankruptcy. This suggests that firms in bankruptcy might not always be economically inefficient and that inefficient firms might not always end up in bankruptcy. The paper is divided into separate sections on bankruptcy liquidation and reorganization. In examining each of those topics, it will consider the features of an economically efficient bankruptcy procedure and how such a procedure might differ from actual U.S. bankruptcy law. In a concluding section, I consider the costs of bankruptcy and some proposed reforms. I argue that some deadweight losses are the unavoidable consequence of having a bankruptcy procedure and cannot be eliminated by reforming it. These deadweight losses are the price of having limited liability for corporate equity holders.
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Citations
Cites
BANKRUPTCY, SECURED DEBT, AND OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Scott, J. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03237.x · Cited by 589
A MEAN‐VARIANCE THEORY OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY
Kim, E. H. (1978) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03388.x · Cited by 564
The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note
ANG, J. S., CHUA, J. H., & MCCONNELL, J. J. (1982) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01104.x · Cited by 415
Bulow, J. I., & Shoven, J. B. (1978) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003592 · Cited by 370
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations
Baird, D. G. (1986) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467806 · Cited by 364
Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-Overs: Reply
Stiglitz, J. E. (1972) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.7916/d82n5c7s · Cited by 252
Bankruptcy, absolute priority, and the pricing of risky debt claims
Warner, J. B. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90002-2 · Cited by 229
Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code
Warner, J. B., & White, M. J. (1983) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02256.x · Cited by 155
Self-citationBankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization
Roe, M. J. (1983) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122304 · Cited by 153
Public Policy toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules
White, M. J. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003379 · Cited by 107
Self-citation
Cited by
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Gilson, S. C., John, K., & Lang, L. H. P. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90059-9 · Cited by 1,094
Debt Enforcement around the World
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/595015 · Cited by 929
Bank contagion: A review of the theory and evidence
Kaufman, G. G. (1994) · Journal of Financial Services Research · doi:10.1007/bf01053812 · Cited by 403
(1997) · Econstor (Econstor) · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- White, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1989-05-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 129-151
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1972989529
- Cited by
- 472
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 35.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.