Detecting Illegal Arms Trade
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose a method to detect illegal arms trade based on investor knowledge. We focus on countries under arms embargo and identify events that suddenly increase or decrease conflict intensity. If a weapon-making company is trading illegally, an event that increases the demand for arms may increase stock prices. We find positive event returns for companies headquartered in countries with high corruption and low transparency in arms trade. We also suggest a method to detect potential embargo violations based on chains of reactions by individual stocks. The presumed violations positively correlate with the number of UN investigations and Internet stories. (JEL D74, F13, G14, K42, L64)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The economic costs of conflict: a case study of the Basque Country
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803321455188 · Cited by 4,517
Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/421174 · Cited by 2,460
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201468 · Cited by 1,755
The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting
DellaVigna, S., & Kaplan, E. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.122.3.1187 · Cited by 1,602
Self-citationPoint Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball
Wolfers, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806777211757 · Cited by 166
Cited by
Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars
Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201468 · Cited by 1,755
Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
Mayzlin, D., Dover, Y., & Chevalier, J. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.8.2421 · Cited by 937
DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION
Gagliarducci, S., & Nannicini, T. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12002 · Cited by 357
Grembi, V., Nannicini, T., & Troiano, U. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20150076 · Cited by 311
Demographics and Industry Returns
DellaVigna, S., & Pollet, J. M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1667 · Cited by 277
Self-citationDiamonds Are Forever, Wars Are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?
Guidolin, M., & La Ferrara, E. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.5.1978 · Cited by 259
Self-citationCleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103 · Cited by 251
Point Shaving: Corruption in NCAA Basketball
Wolfers, J. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806777211757 · Cited by 166
(2015) · International Conference on Information Systems · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Della Vigna, S., & La Ferrara, E.
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2010-11-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 26-57
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W2141741726
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 13.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.