The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Strategic Value of Carbon Tariffs
Open accessAbstract
We ask whether the threat of carbon tariffs might lower the cost of reductions in world carbon emissions by inducing unregulated regions to adopt emission controls. We use a numerical model to generate payoffs of a game in which a coalition regulates emissions and chooses whether to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated regions. Unregulated regions respond by abating, retaliating, or ignoring the tariffs. In the Nash equilibrium, the use of tariffs is a credible and effective threat. It induces cooperation from noncoalition regions that lowers the cost of global abatement substantially relative to the case where the coalition acts alone. (JEL D58, F13, F18, H23, Q54, Q58)
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“Many studies indicate that such BCAs would shift the economic consequences of emission reduction from abating industrialized countries to nonabating countries (93, 156-160).”
From Carbon Leakage, Consumption, and Trade (2022) · cites this paper as [156]
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Cites
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Peters, G. P., Minx, J. C., Weber, C. L., & Edenhofer, O. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1006388108 · Cited by 1,609
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Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy
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The path solver: a nommonotone stabilization scheme for mixed complementarity problems
Dirkse, S. P., & Ferris, M. C. (1995) · Optimization methods & software · doi:10.1080/10556789508805606 · Cited by 749
Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country
Hoel, M. (1991) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/0095-0696(91)90023-c · Cited by 516
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The economic impacts of the carbon tariffs
Liang, J. (2022) · BCP Business & Management · doi:10.54691/bcpbm.v23i.1402 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Böhringer, C., Carbone, J. C., & Rutherford, T. F.
- Affiliations
- Chair of Economic Policy, Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany (e-mail: )
- Colorado School of Mines (US)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Venue
- American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2016-02-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 28-51
- ISSN
- 1945-7731 (ISSN-L)
- 1945-774X
- OpenAlex
- W3125074174
- Cited by
- 130
- References
- 42
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 14.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.aeaweb.org
- Locations
- American Economic Journal Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
- Keywords
- carbon tariffs, carbon leakage, international climate policy, emission reduction, coalition formation, retaliation, Nash equilibrium, credible threats
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