Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-riding in International Climate Policy
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)
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“In game-theoretical terms, the associated trade measures would be sanctions, in the absence of which there is no hope of avoiding free-riding in global climate politics (52, 176).”
From Carbon Leakage, Consumption, and Trade (2022) · cites this paper as [176]
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“Given this, the logical deduction would be to free ride '-receive the benefits of a public good without contributing to the costs' (Nordhaus 2015, p. 1339).”
From Conceptualizing the Differences in the Perception and Internalization of Racism Between Black African Immigrants and African Americans in the United States (2025) · cites this paper as Nordhaus 2015
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationCoalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
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D'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J. J., & Weymark, J. A. (1983) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/134972 · Cited by 899
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Nordhaus William D, 1996, American Economic Review, 86, 741
Cited by
Revisiting the social cost of carbon
Nordhaus, W. D. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1609244114 · Cited by 1,366
Self-citationClimate Change: The Ultimate Challenge for Economics
Nordhaus, W. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.109.6.1991 · Cited by 941
Self-citationIron and Steel Technology Roadmap: Towards more sustainable steelmaking
International Energy Agency (2020) · OECD eBooks · doi:10.1787/3dcc2a1b-en · Cited by 681
Real effects of climate policy: Financial constraints and spillovers
Bartram, S. M., Hou, K., & Kim, S. (2022) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.015 · Cited by 616
Baranzini, A., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Carattini, S., Howarth, R. B., Padilla, E., & Roca, J. (2017) · WIREs Climate Change · doi:10.1002/wcc.462 · Cited by 487
Metadata
- Authors
- Nordhaus, W.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nordhaus, William
- ORCID
- Nordhaus, William
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-04-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1339-1370
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162057064
- Cited by
- 1,362
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 119 · 2025: 166 · 2024: 136 · 2023: 131 · 2022: 142 · 2021: 178 · 2020: 141 · 2019: 100 · 2018: 75 · 2017: 72 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 40
- FWCI
- 199.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- U.S. Department of Energy
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › International Environmental Law and Policies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Keywords
- climate clubs, free-riding, international climate policy, coalition formation, sanctions, Kyoto Protocol, abatement, climate change mitigation, international environmental agreements
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