The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects
Open accessAbstract
This paper develops a framework for measuring “tipping”—the increase in a firm's market share dominance caused by indirect network effects. Our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects. In practice, this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects. We build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware/software paradigm. To demonstrate its applicability, we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32/64-bit generation of video game consoles, a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects. In our example, we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong, economically significant increase in market concentration. We also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side, as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war, and on the supply side, as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks.
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Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Brand and Quantity Choice Dynamics Under Price Uncertainty
Erdem, T., Imai, S., & Keane, M. P. (2003) · Quantitative Marketing and Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1023536326497 · Cited by 331
Network effects without network externalities
Chou, C.-F., & Shy, O. (1990) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(90)90019-w · Cited by 249
Coordination versus differentiation in a standards war: 56K modems
Augereau, A., Greenstein, S., & Rysman, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00062.x · Cited by 114
Cited by
The impact of digital transformation on the retailing value chain
Reinartz, W., Wiegand, N., & Imschloss, M. (2019) · International Journal of Research in Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.ijresmar.2018.12.002 · Cited by 583
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 504
Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets
Lee, R. S. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.7.2960 · Cited by 446
Marchand, A., & Hennig-Thurau, T. (2013) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.intmar.2013.05.001 · Cited by 345
The Role of Marketing in Digital Business Platforms
Rangaswamy, A., Moch, N., Felten, C., Van Bruggen, G., Wieringa, J. E., & Wirtz, J. (2020) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.intmar.2020.04.006 · Cited by 310
Metadata
- Authors
- Dubé, J.-P. H., Hitsch, G. J., & Chintagunta, P. K.
- Venue
- Marketing Science
- Published
- 2010-03
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 216-249
- ISSN
- 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-548X
- OpenAlex
- W3123205708
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 43.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Dubé, J.-P. H., Hitsch, G. J., & Chintagunta, P. K. (2010). Tipping and Concentration in Markets with Indirect Network Effects. Marketing Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1090.0541
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