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Negotiations and Exclusivity Contracts for Advertising
Open accessAbstract
Exclusive advertising on a given media outlet is usually profitable for an advertiser because consumers are less aware of competing products. However, for such arrangements to exist, media must benefit as well. We examine conditions under which such exclusive advertising contracts benefit both advertisers and media outlets (referred to as stations) by illustrating that exclusive equilibria arise in a theoretical model of the media, advertisers, and consumers who participate in both the product and media markets. In the model, stations sell advertising space to advertisers and broadcast advertising messages to consumers. Conditions leading to higher equilibrium levels of advertising can be unprofitable for advertisers because high levels of advertising make consumers better informed and thus lead to fiercer product price competition. As a result, media stations may be less profitable as well because their payoff is determined as a fraction of the advertiser surplus generated in the product market. Stations mitigate this effect by offering advertisers exclusive advertising contracts. With such contracts, consumers are less informed about competing products, yielding higher producer surplus. It is profitable for stations to offer exclusivity when commercial advertising is an important means for advertisers to inform consumers about their products.
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Citations
Cited by
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets
Baye, M. R., & Morgan, J. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.3.454 · Cited by 629
A two-sided, empirical model of television advertising and viewing markets
Wilbur, K. C. (2008) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.1070.0303 · Cited by 342
Content and advertising in the media: Pay-tv versus free-to-air
Peitz, M., & Valletti, T. M. (2008) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.08.003 · Cited by 304
Managing competition on a two‐sided platform
Belleflamme, P., & Peitz, M. (2019) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/jems.12311 · Cited by 109
Metadata
- Authors
- Dukes, A., & Gal–Or, E.
- Venue
- Marketing Science
- Published
- 2003-05
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 222-245
- ISSN
- 0732-2399 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-548X
- OpenAlex
- W1999386297
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 31.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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