The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Open accessAbstract
In this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989, “Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach,” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1–25). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. Our experiments demonstrate that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, higher net revenues, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationComputationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
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Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
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Cited by
Consensus-Based Decentralized Auctions for Robust Task Allocation
Choi, H.-L., Brunet, L., & How, J. P. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Robotics · doi:10.1109/tro.2009.2022423 · Cited by 1,128
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
de Vries, S., & Vohra, R. V. (2003) · INFORMS Journal on Computing · doi:10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077 · Cited by 985
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Lehmann, D., Oćallaghan, L. I., & Shoham, Y. (2002) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/585265.585266 · Cited by 655
Behavior in operations management: Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions
Bendoly, E., Donohue, K., & Schultz, K. L. (2006) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2005.10.001 · Cited by 550
Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1609 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Kwasnica, A. M., Ledyard, J. O., Porter, D., & DeMartini, C.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 419-434
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2112959886
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 41
- FWCI
- 37.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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