Partnership in a Dynamic Production System with Unobservable Actions and Noncontractible Output
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper considers two firms that engage in joint production. The prospect of repeated interaction introduces dynamics, in that actions that firms take today influence the costliness and effectiveness of actions in the future. Repeated interaction also facilitates the use of informal agreements (relational contracts) that are sustained not by the court system, but by the ongoing value of the relationship. We characterize the optimal relational contract in this dynamic system with double moral hazard. We show that an optimal relational contract has a simple form that does not depend on the past history. The optimal relational contract may require that the firms terminate their relationship with positive probability following poor performance. We show how process visibility, which allows the firms to better assess who is at fault, can substantially improve system performance. The degree to which process visibility eliminates the need for termination depends on the nature of the dynamics: If the buyer's action does not influence the dynamics, the need for termination is eliminated; otherwise, termination may be required.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.9.2.141 · Cited by 4,179 · cited 1×
“An alternative perspective is that successful collaboration, especially between large firms, requires developing and refining institutional routines for partnering and reciprocity (Powell et al. 1996, Zaheer et al. 1998).”
BackgroundThe Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 1×
“This paper was with the authors 4 months for 2 revisions.”
BackgroundSubjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies
Aumann, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 · Cited by 1,630
Cited by
Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains
Kim, S.-H., Cohen, M. A., & Netessine, S. (2007) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0741 · Cited by 520
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions through operations and supply chain management
Plambeck, E. L. (2012) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.031 · Cited by 302
“…detailed information about the maintenance schedule and process variables like temperature, Ph, and feed rate may help to determine whether the manufacturer or feedstock supplier is responsible for a microbial contamination problem that reduces the process yield (Plambeck and Taylor, 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationInformation technology, Repeated Contracts, and the Number of Suppliers
Aral, S., Bakos, Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2631 · Cited by 65
Metadata
- Authors
- Plambeck, E. L., & Taylor, T. A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2006-10
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1509-1527
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2080502712
- Cited by
- 90
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 9.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.