The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Contracting in Supply Chains: A Laboratory Investigation
Abstract
The coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically. We investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract. The simplified setting we consider utilizes a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem, the supplier has no capacity constraints, and delivery occurs instantaneously. We compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier. Results indicate that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract, the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts. We also find that although the buyback and revenue-sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent, they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences
McGinn, L. C. (1957) · Journal of the Franklin Institute · doi:10.1016/0016-0032(57)90766-4 · Cited by 7,204
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Camerer, C. F. (2003) · Cited by 3,722
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261737 · Cited by 3,194 · cited 1×
“Loss aversion is affected by framing because people dislike losses more than they dislike forgone gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Kahneman et al. 1990), and thus the way that we frame demand distribution affects how participants perceive gains and losses.”
BackgroundExperimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (2000) · Behavioral Law and Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139175197.009 · Cited by 2,873
Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts
Cachon, G. P. (2003) · Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science · doi:10.1016/s0927-0507(03)11006-7 · Cited by 2,683
Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215 · Cited by 2,469
Cited by
Dual Sales Channel Management with Service Competition
Chen, K.-Y., Kaya, M., & Özer, Ö. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0177 · Cited by 457
Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
Loch, C. H., & Wu, Y. (2008) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0910 · Cited by 457
Trust in Forecast Information Sharing
Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334 · Cited by 421
Bounded Rationality in Newsvendor Models
Su, X. (2008) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0200 · Cited by 411
Metadata
- Authors
- Katok, E., & Wu, D. Y.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2009-12
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 1953-1968
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2033205768
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 21.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Contracting in Supply Chains: A Laboratory Investigation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1089
- The paper
- Katok, E., & Wu, D. Y. (2009). Contracting in Supply Chains: A Laboratory Investigation. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1089
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.