The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trust in Forecast Information Sharing
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates the capacity investment decision of a supplier who solicits private forecast information from a manufacturer. To ensure abundant supply, the manufacturer has an incentive to inflate her forecast in a costless, nonbinding, and nonverifiable type of communication known as “cheap talk.” According to standard game theory, parties do not cooperate and the only equilibrium is uninformative—the manufacturer's report is independent of her forecast and the supplier does not use the report to determine capacity. However, we observe in controlled laboratory experiments that parties cooperate even in the absence of reputation-building mechanisms and complex contracts. We argue that the underlying reason for cooperation is trust and trustworthiness. The extant literature on forecast sharing and supply chain coordination implicitly assumes that supply chain members either absolutely trust each other and cooperate when sharing forecast information, or do not trust each other at all. Contrary to this all-or-nothing view, we determine that a continuum exists between these two extremes. In addition, we determine (i) when trust is important in forecast information sharing, (ii) how trust is affected by changes in the supply chain environment, and (iii) how trust affects related operational decisions. To explain and better understand the observed behavioral regularities, we also develop an analytical model of trust to incorporate both pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives in the game-theoretic analysis of cheap-talk forecast communication. The model identifies and quantifies how trust and trustworthiness induce effective cheap-talk forecast sharing under the wholesale price contract. We also determine the impact of repeated interactions and information feedback on trust and cooperation in forecast sharing. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of our results for developing effective forecast management policies. This paper was accepted by Ananth Iyer, operations and supply chain management.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A new look at the statistical model identification
Akaike, H. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.1974.1100705 · Cited by 51,879
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
An integrative model of organizational trust
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258792 · Cited by 10,736
Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View Of Trust
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1998.926617 · Cited by 10,274
An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller Relationships
Doney, P. M., & Cannon, J. P. (1997) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.2307/1251829 · Cited by 6,822
Design and Analysis: A Researcher's Handbook
Beaton, A. E., & Keppel, G. (1975) · American Educational Research Journal · doi:10.2307/1162588 · Cited by 5,822
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 · Cited by 5,548
Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect
Lee, H. L., Padmanabhan, V., & Whang, S. (1997) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546 · Cited by 4,698
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Cited by
At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust: Trust Across Multiple Organizational Levels
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206312439327 · Cited by 886
Pournader, M., Shi, Y., Seuring, S., & Koh, S. C. L. (2020) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2019.1650976 · Cited by 854
Blockchain-enabled supply chain: An experimental study
Longo, F., Nicoletti, L., Padovano, A., d'Atri, G., & Forte, M. (2019) · Computers & Industrial Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.cie.2019.07.026 · Cited by 383
Supplier Encroachment, Information Sharing, and Channel Structure in Online Retail Platforms
Ha, A. Y., Luo, H., & Shang, W. (2022) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.13607 · Cited by 375
Multi‐Methodological Research in Operations Management
Choi, T., Cheng, T. C. E., & Zhao, X. (2016) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.12534 · Cited by 206
Metadata
- Authors
- Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1111-1137
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2150095491
- Cited by
- 421
- References
- 74
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trust in Forecast Information Sharing. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334
- The paper
- Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y. (2011). Trust in Forecast Information Sharing. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.