The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Goods vs. Industrial Goods: Cost Structure and Competition
Abstract
We study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods. Markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. As a result, a monopoly will offer only a single product. Competition leads to highly concentrated information-good markets, with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects. We study how the structure of the firms' cost functions drives our results. This paper was accepted by Barrie R. Nault, information systems.
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Cites
Software Engineering Economics
Boehm, B. W. (2001) · Pioneers and Their Contributions to Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-48354-7_5 · Cited by 5,981
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Cited by
Strategic Analysis of the Agency Model for Digital Goods
Tan, Y. (., & Carrillo, J. E. (2017) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.12595 · Cited by 343
Economics of Free Under Perpetual Licensing: Implications for the Software Industry
Niculescu, M. F., & Wu, D. J. (2014) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2013.0508 · Cited by 151
The implications of offering free versions for the performance of paid mobile apps
Arora, S., ter Hofstede, F., & Mahajan, V. (2017) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.15.0205 · Cited by 127
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, R., & Mendelson, H.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2011-01
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 164-176
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2143718552
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 36.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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