The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications?
Abstract
This paper reports on the results of an experimental elicitation at the individual level of all prospect theory components (i.e., utility, loss aversion, and weighting functions) in two decision contexts: situations where alternatives are described as probability distributions and situations where the decision maker must experience unknown probability distributions through sampling before choice. For description-based decisions, our results are fully consistent with prospect theory's empirical findings under risk. Furthermore, no significant differences are detected across contexts as regards utility and loss aversion. Whereas decision weights exhibit similar qualitative properties across contexts typically found under prospect theory, our data suggest that, for gains at least, the subjective treatment of uncertainty in experience-based and description-based decisions is significantly different. More specifically, we observe a less pronounced overweighting of small probabilities and a more pronounced underweighting of moderate and high probabilities for experience-based decisions. On the contrary, for losses, no significant differences were observed in the evaluation of prospects across contexts. This paper was accepted by George Wu, decision analysis.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
Schmidt, U., & Zank, H. (2005) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/s11166-005-6564-6 · Cited by 194 · cited 2×
“Eliciting loss aversion requires that the utility be measured both for gains and for losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Schmidt and Zank 2005).”
Background
Cited by
A meta-analytic review of two modes of learning and the description-experience gap.
Wulff, D. U., Mergenthaler-Canseco, M., & Hertwig, R. (2018) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000115 · Cited by 271
Looming Large or Seeming Small? Attitudes Towards Losses in a Representative Sample
Chapman, J., Snowberg, E., Wang, S. W., & Camerer, C. (2025) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdae093 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Abdellaoui, M., L'Haridon, O., & Paraschiv, C.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2011-10
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1879-1895
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2003156116
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 3.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Abdellaoui, M., L'Haridon, O., & Paraschiv, C. (2011). Experienced vs. Described Uncertainty: Do We Need Two Prospect Theory Specifications? Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1368
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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