The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn
Abstract
To explore the effects of different incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a randomized field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using mechanisms with features of an all-pay auction. In our study, we systematically vary the size of the reward as well as the presence of a soft reserve, or early high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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Cites
Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation Contests: An Empirical Analysis
Boudreau, K. J., Lacetera, N., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1322 · Cited by 830
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.556 · Cited by 739
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
SELF‐SELECTION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF TOURNAMENTS
ERIKSSON, T., TEYSSIER, S., & VILLEVAL, M. (2009) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00094.x · Cited by 142
Cited by
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Humans and Technology: Forms of Conjoined Agency in Organizations
Murray, A., Rhymer, J., & Sirmon, D. G. (2021) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2019.0186 · Cited by 518
Crowdsourcing: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research
Ghezzi, A., Gabelloni, D., Martini, A., & Natalicchio, A. (2018) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/ijmr.12135 · Cited by 353
Market Mechanisms in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending
Wei, Z., & Lin, M. (2017) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2016.2531 · Cited by 274
Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Rewards for Contributing Reviews in an Online Platform
Khern-am-nuai, W., Kannan, K., & Ghasemkhani, H. (2018) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.2017.0750 · Cited by 260
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, T. X., Yang, J., Adamic, L. A., & Chen, Y.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2014-08
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2020-2037
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2040034367
- Cited by
- 238
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 21.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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