Cheating and Loss Aversion: Do People Cheat More to Avoid a Loss?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real-effort matrix task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design with 600 experimental participants to examine whether the extent of cheating is reference dependent. Self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition—a clear indication of cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame under no monitoring. The fear of a loss seems to lead to more dishonest behavior than the lure of a gain. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2313 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937956 · Cited by 6,432 · cited 2×
“Although point estimates of the size of such loss aversion depend on the decision-making framework, a factor of 2 is often mentioned as the psychological weight attached to losses compared with gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1991).”
Gender Differences in Preferences
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 · Cited by 5,694
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633 · Cited by 2,875 · cited 6×
“A different view assumes that people are basically honest and dislike lying or cheating based on norms, but circumstances may tempt them and can lead them to lie or cheat (Mazar et al. 2008).”
InfluentialHeath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Wu, G. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0708 · Cited by 1,009
Chapter 113 Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008) · Handbook of Experimental Economics Results · doi:10.1016/s1574-0722(07)00113-8 · Cited by 924 · cited 1×
“The literature on simple lottery choices seems to be inconclusive with regard to a gender difference in loss aversion (for surveys, see, e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2008, Croson and Gneezy 2009).”
Toma, C. L., Hancock, J. T., & Ellison, N. B. (2008) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167208318067 · Cited by 655
An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion
Schmidt, U., & Traub, S. (2002) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1020923921649 · Cited by 233
Cited by
Fischer, S., & Grosch, K. (2025) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2025.05.012 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Grolleau, G., Kocher, M. G., & Sutan, A.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3428-3438
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W1660023194
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 41.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.