Reputation and Regulations: Evidence from eBay
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To mitigate inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information, some markets rely on government interventions, whereas others rely on reputation systems, warranties, or guarantees. This paper explores the impact of two mechanisms, namely, reputation badges and buyer protection programs, and their interaction on eBay’s marketplace. Adding buyer protection reduces the premium for the reputation badge and increases efficiency in the marketplace. These efficiency gains are achieved by reducing moral hazard through an increase in sellers´ quality and by reducing adverse selection through a higher exit rate for low-quality sellers. Our estimates suggest buyer protection increases the total welfare by 2.9%. This paper was accepted by Matt Shum, marketing.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Promotional Reviews: An Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation
Mayzlin, D., Dover, Y., & Chevalier, J. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.8.2421 · Cited by 937
THE DYNAMICS OF SELLER REPUTATION: EVIDENCE FROM EBAY*
CABRAL, L., & HORTAÇSU, A. (2010) · The Journal of Industrial Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00405.x · Cited by 505
Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com
Edelman, B. G., & Luca, M. (2014) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2377353 · Cited by 471
The Limits of Reputation in Platform Markets: An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment
Nosko, C., & Tadelis, S. (2015) · doi:10.3386/w20830 · Cited by 229
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets
Tadelis, S. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 · Cited by 524
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 504
Does Machine Translation Affect International Trade? Evidence from a Large Digital Platform
Brynjolfsson, E., Hui, X., & Liu, M. (2019) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3388 · Cited by 408
Self-citationDoes Machine Translation Affect International Trade? Evidence from a Large Digital Platform
Brynjolfsson, E., Hui, X., & Liu, M. (2018) · doi:10.3386/w24917 · Cited by 408
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hui, X., Saeedi, M., Shen, Z., & Sundaresan, N.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-12
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3604-3616
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2281896605
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 16.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.