Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between bank lobbying and supervisory decisions of regulators and documents its moral hazard implications. Exploiting bank-level information on the universe of commercial and savings banks in the United States, I find that regulators are 44.7% less likely to initiate enforcement actions against lobbying banks. This result is robust across measures of lobbying and accounts for endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental variables strategies. In addition, I show that lobbying banks are riskier and reliably underperform their nonlobbying peers. Overall, these results appear rather inconsistent with an information-based explanation of bank lobbying, but consistent with the theory of regulatory capture. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.
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Cites
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Matching As An Econometric Evaluation Estimator
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lambert, T.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2019-06
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2545-2572
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3125676014
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 16.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Lambert, T. (2019). Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2895
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.