The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Effects of Ambiguity in Market Experiments
Abstract
Prior studies have shown that individuals are averse to ambiguity in probability. Many decisions are, however, made in market settings where an individual's decision is influenced by decisions of others participating in the market. In this paper, we extend the previous research to evaluate the effect of ambiguity on individual decisions and the resulting market price in market settings. We therefore examine an important issue: whether ambiguity effects persist in the face of market incentives and feedback. Two different market organizations, the sealed bid auction and the double oral auction, were employed. The subjects in the experiments were graduate business students and bank executives. Our results show that the individual bids and market prices for lotteries with ambiguous probabilities are consistently lower than the corresponding bids and market prices for equivalent lotteries with well-defined probabilities. The aversion to ambiguity therefore does not vanish in market settings. Our results provide insights into what a manager can expect in bidding situations where the object of the sale (oil leases, mineral rights) involves ambiguity in probability due to, for example, lack of information or prior experience. The results may also be useful in understanding some phenomena in insurance and equity markets.
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Citations
Cites
“Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.”
Ellsberg, D. (1961) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884324 · Cited by 7,891
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795
Self-citation
Cited by
Recent developments in modeling preferences: Uncertainty and ambiguity
Camerer, C., & Weber, M. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122575 · Cited by 1,795
Self-citationExperimenter demand effects in economic experiments
Zizzo, D. J. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z · Cited by 1,194
The disposition effect in securities trading: an experimental analysis
Weber, M., & Camerer, C. F. (1998) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00089-9 · Cited by 921
Self-citationInvestor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Teoh, S. H. (2002) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(01)00091-5 · Cited by 759
Behavior in operations management: Assessing recent findings and revisiting old assumptions
Bendoly, E., Donohue, K., & Schultz, K. L. (2006) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2005.10.001 · Cited by 550
Metadata
- Authors
- Sarin, R. K., & Weber, M.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 1993-05
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 602-615
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2013500674
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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