The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Entrepreneurs, Contracts, and the Failure of Young Firms
Abstract
Although economic theory has emphasized that moral hazard and hold-up problems influence the design of contracts, very little is known about the process by which explicit contracts are established and the effect of contractual arrangements on firm performance. This paper attempts to demonstrate that firms are selected for survival on the basis of contracting efficiency. Based on a statistical analysis of 170 new franchise contracts and interviews with the founders of 16 of these new franchise systems, we show that new franchise chains that adopt exclusive territories are more likely to survive over time than chains that do not. Moreover, successful and failed entrepreneurs possess different information about how to design contracts. These entrepreneurs undertake “contractual experiments” based on the information they possess. Those whose experiments prove to be more consistent with economic theory are rewarded for their superior information with survival.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R & D
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233763 · Cited by 7,530
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
Caves, R. E., & II, W. F. M. (1976) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056250 · Cited by 694
Cited by
The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship
Acs, Z. J., Braunerhjelm, P., Audretsch, D. B., & Carlsson, B. (2009) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-008-9157-3 · Cited by 1,834
Baron, R. A., & Ensley, M. D. (2006) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0538 · Cited by 1,331
The Individual-Opportunity Nexus
Shane, S., & Eckhardt, J. (2003) · Handbook of Entrepreneurship Research · doi:10.1007/0-387-24519-7_8 · Cited by 454
Self-citationBlair, R. D., & Lafontaine, F. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511753879 · Cited by 364
Capabilities, Transaction Costs, and Firm Boundaries
Argyres, N. S., & Zenger, T. R. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0736 · Cited by 323
Metadata
- Authors
- Azoulay, P., & Shane, S.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337-358
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W2118226378
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 8.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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