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Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
Abstract
Vande Vate (1989) described the polytope whose extreme points are the stable (core) matchings in the Marriage Problem. Rothblum (1989) simplified and extended this result. This paper explores a corresponding linear program, its dual and consequences of the fact that the dual solutions have an unusually direct relation to the primal solutions. This close relationship allows us to provide simple proofs both of Vande Vate and Rothblum's results and of other important results about the core of marriage markets. These proofs help explain the structure shared by the marriage problem (without sidepayments) and the assignment game (with sidepayments). The paper further explores “fractional” matchings, which may be interpreted as lotteries over possible matches or as time-sharing arrangements. We show that those fractional matchings in the Stable Marriage Polytope form a lattice with respect to a partial ordering that involves stochastic dominance. Thus, all expected utility functions corresponding to the same ordinal preferences will agree on the relevant comparisons. Finally, we provide linear programming proofs of slightly stronger versions of known incentive compatibility results.
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Citations
Cites
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827 · Cited by 5,985
Cited by
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2005) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004 · Cited by 536
Self-citationAlgorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
Manlove, D. F. (2013) · Series on Theoretical Computer Science · doi:10.1142/8591 · Cited by 515
Stability in Supply Chain Networks
Ostrovsky, M. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.897 · Cited by 288
Stable Matching for Dynamic Ride-Sharing Systems
Wang, X., Agatz, N., & Erera, A. (2018) · Transportation Science · doi:10.1287/trsc.2017.0768 · Cited by 268
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., & Vande Vate, J. H.
- Venue
- Mathematics of Operations Research
- Published
- 1993-11
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 803-828
- ISSN
- 0364-765X (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5471
- OpenAlex
- W2168987865
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 7.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Roth, A. E., Rothblum, U. G., & Vande Vate, J. H. (1993). Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming. Mathematics of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803
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