The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pairwise kidney exchange
Open accessAbstract
The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the size of exchanges. Initially, kidney exchanges are likely to be between just two patient–donor pairs. We show that, although this constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient–donor pairs and surgeons have 0–1 preferences. This includes deterministic mechanisms that accommodate the priority setting that organ banks currently use to allocate cadaver organs, and stochastic mechanisms that allow distributive justice issues to be addressed.
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Edmonds, J. (1965) · Canadian Journal of Mathematics · doi:10.4153/cjm-1965-045-4 · Cited by 2,428
Cited by
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Roth, A. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.3.37 · Cited by 560
Self-citationIncreasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two- and Three-Way Exchanges
Saidman, S. L., Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U., & Delmonico, F. L. (2006) · Transplantation · doi:10.1097/01.tp.0000195775.77081.25 · Cited by 263
Self-citationIncentive Design in Peer Review: Rating and Repeated Endogenous Matching
Xiao, Y., Dorfler, F., & Schaar, M. V. D. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2018.2877578 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-12
- Volume
- 125
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 151-188
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2234443685
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 32.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2005). Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
