Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Pseudoscience, superstitions, and quackery are serious problems that threaten public health and in which many variables are involved. Psychology, however, has much to say about them, as it is the illusory perceptions of causality of so many people that needs to be understood. The proposal we put forward is that these illusions arise from the normal functioning of the cognitive system when trying to associate causes and effects. Thus, we propose to apply basic research and theories on causal learning to reduce the impact of pseudoscience. We review the literature on the illusion of control and the causal learning traditions, and then present an experiment as an illustration of how this approach can provide fruitful ideas to reduce pseudoscientific thinking. The experiment first illustrates the development of a quackery illusion through the testimony of fictitious patients who report feeling better. Two different predictions arising from the integration of the causal learning and illusion of control domains are then proven effective in reducing this illusion. One is showing the testimony of people who feel better without having followed the treatment. The other is asking participants to think in causal terms rather than in terms of effectiveness.
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Citations
Cites
Gosling, S. D., Vazire, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. P. (2004) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.59.2.93 · Cited by 2,932
Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser?
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.108.4.441 · Cited by 1,692
Skinner, B. F. (1948) · Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0055873 · Cited by 1,456 · cited 1×
“…prior to the outcome) and an outcome strengthen the perception of contingency between the two variables (e.g., Kao & Wasserman, 1993), the perception of causality and/or prediction between them (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987), as well as the resultant behaviour (e.g., Skinner, 1948; Vyse, 1997).”
Background
Cited by
Lilienfeld, S. O., Ritschel, L. A., Lynn, S. J., Cautin, R. L., & Latzman, R. D. (2014) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691614535216 · Cited by 191
The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2504 · Cited by 118
Placebo effects in alternative medical treatments for anxiety: false hope or healing potential?
Escolà-Gascón, Á., Dagnall, N., Drinkwater, K., Denovan, A., & Benito-León, J. (2025) · CNS Spectrums · doi:10.1017/s1092852925100515 · Cited by 1
“40 In this context, magical beliefs (the irrational processing of information, according to the dual process theory) act as a conditioner that generates the conditioned stimulus “ the crystal works.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Matute, H., Yarritu, I., & Vadillo, M. A.
- Venue
- British Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-03-16
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 392-405
- ISSN
- 0007-1269 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-8295
- OpenAlex
- W1585587308
- Cited by
- 117
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 5.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Matute, H., Yarritu, I., & Vadillo, M. A. (2011). Illusions of causality at the heart of pseudoscience. British Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1348/000712610x532210
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