Promising Across Lives to Save Non-Existent Beings: Identity, Rebirth and the Bodhisattva’s Vow

The Indian Mahāyāna tradition portrays the bodhisattva as committing to stay within cyclic existence over many lifetimes for the sake of all sentient beings.

“Perhaps the most striking feature of the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist moral tradition is its conception of the bodhisattva who vows with infinite compassion to remain in saṃsāra for endless lives to work for the benefit of sentient beings.”

• Also stated in: § PROMISING ACROSS LIVES TO SAVE NON-EXISTENT BEINGS: IDENTITY, REBIRTH, AND THE BODHISATTVA'S VOW · plain

  “For as long as space endures and for as long as the world lasts, may I live dispelling the miseries of the world.(10 : 55, in Śāntideva 1997, p. 144)”

• cites Śāntideva 1997Not matched

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Causal continuity alone cannot establish personal identity, as an oak growing from a grave does not maintain the person's identity.

“Merely the fact of causal continuity itself, of course, will not suffice; we cannot claim, for instance, that an oak growing out of the grave of a person maintains the identity of the person, even if the body nourishes the tree.”

A theory that makes karmic continuity sufficient for identity conflicts with intuitions, since it would imply that a person can become someone else when another experiences the karmic results of their actions.

“If karmic continuity was sufficient for continuity of identity, and there were a sufficient amount of these connections, this would mean that Sam would now be Bill, but intuitively this seems to be the wrong result.”

The content of the bodhisattva's commitment makes it likely that he will complete it even without remembering the vow.

“The content of the bodhisattva's commitment, then, is such that he is likely to complete it, even if he no longer remembers making the vow itself.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The bodhisattva's vow is to perfect the virtues of full Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings.

The bodhisattva is likely to keep the promise even if he forgets the vow and does not retake it, at least for many lives.

“Just as importantly, however, there is a sense that the bodhisattva will likely keep his promise even if he both forgets the vow and does not retake it, at least for many lives.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The bodhisattva's vow is to perfect the virtues of full Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings.

Taking the traditional bodhisattva vow literally is plausible despite the major physical and psychological break after each death.

“In this section, I have tried to show that taking the traditional formulation of the bodhisattva's vow more literally is plausible, despite the significant break in physical and psychological continuity that occurs after every death.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The bodhisattva's vow is to perfect the virtues of full Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings.

Buddhist psychology holds that habits of attention and concentration also continue across lives.

“There is also a great deal of psychological continuity in habits of attention and concentration that are passed from life to life.”

• cites [29]Not matched

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Identity ascriptions have some flexibility but are constrained by how partite entities fit into human interaction.

“there will be a certain amount of flexibility over when such ascriptions can be made.”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · plain

  “Nevertheless, the application of these concepts will be constrained by the ways partite entities fit into human forms of interaction.”

Amnesiacs are normally treated as continuous partly because their memories may return and others encourage them to identify with their past self, conditions absent in rebirth.

“Nevertheless, the amnesiac person is naturally described as maintaining her identity for two reasons not analogous to rebirth: her memories are likely to return, and she will be encouraged by loved ones and society to identify with the person she was before.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Amnesiacs are naturally regarded as maintaining their identity.

Because of deep psychological continuity between lives, ascriptions of identity continuity are at least plausible for the bodhisattva.

“Based on the deep layer of psychological continuity between lives, ascriptions of continuity of identity are at least plausible for the bodhisattva.”

This does not force us to see the bodhisattva project as one multilife endeavor bound by a single initial commitment.

“None of this entails that we must view the project of the bodhisattva as a multilife endeavor bound together by a single commitment formed at the beginning of the path.”

The absence of ordinary memory between lives may be less problematic for identity continuity than it initially appears.

“That surface-level phenomena like ordinary memory are not may be less of an issue in relation to continuity of identity than it at first seems.”

Buddhist psychology holds that habitual emotional, affective, and intellectual dispositions (anuśayas) are carried with the karmic stream from one life to another.

“Buddhists refer to negative emotional and intellectual propensities as anuśayas, our habitual dispositions to become angry, to crave, and so on.”

• Also stated in: § Deep Psychological Continuity across Lives · plain

  “Significantly, Buddhist authors claim that these underlying habitual dispositions travel from life to life with the karmic stream.”

• cites [24]Not matched

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Claims that enlightened persons remember past lives do not fit naturally into a Buddhist theory of identity continuity.

“In the fourth, I argue that Buddhist claims about enlightened persons remembering past lives cannot natu rally be incorporated into a Buddhist theory of continuity of identity.”

For Buddhists, causal continuity and the physical and psychological continuity it enables ground identity ascriptions within a single life.

“Further, causal continuity, and the person-associated phenomena like physical and psychological continuity that it enables, grounds ascriptions of continuity of identity within a life.”

• cites [7]Not matched

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Because persons function in social life, Buddhist concepts of personhood and identity continuity are closely tied to physical and psychological continuity.

“For this reason, concepts like”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · plain

  “Like all persons, Buddhists grow up in families, develop careers and projects, have relationships, and so on, all of which depend on physical and/or psychological continuity.”

Buddhists must assign at least some importance to physical and/or psychological continuity when determining identity continuity.

“What this means is that Buddhists must give at least some importance to physical and/or psychological continuity in determining when continuity of identity holds.”

In an important sense, a bodhisattva can fulfill his vow in later lives without remembering the vow.

“I also argue that in an important sense the bodhisattva can keep his vow in future lives, even if he does not remember making it.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Physical continuity is not required for identity to continue across lives.

Over many lives, the bodhisattva retakes the vow without knowing whether he starts the path or continues an ancient commitment.

“For numerous iterations, the bodhisattva will retake this vow, not knowing whether he is initiating the process to becoming a full Buddha, or building upon a commitment that was made many eons ago.”

Buddhist texts normally represent continuity of conventional identity between past and future persons through pronouns that span lives and explicit trans-life identifications.

“Instead, they indicate continuity of conventional identity between past and future persons by use of personal pronouns ranging over multiple lives and by explicit ascriptions of trans-life identification.”

Buddhist psychology places affective and emotional responses at a deeper cognitive level than ordinary intellectual thought.

“It is also worth noting that in Buddhist psychology these affective and emotional responses take place at a much deeper cognitive level than ordinary intellectual thought.”

• cites [28]Not matched

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Given deep psychological continuity and cases where identity is indeterminate, Buddhists may extend identity across lives and regard the reborn person as continuing the deceased person's identity to some degree.

“In dependence on this deep layer of psychological continuity, and the fact that there should be indeterminate cases where it is not clear if identity holds, it is open to those within the Buddhist tradition to extend the concept of identity across lives and identify, at least to a certain extent, the one who is reborn as continuing the identity of the one who dies.”

The difficulty of cross-life identity ascription stems from complete physical discontinuity and extensive psychological discontinuity.

“the problem with ascribing identity across lives arises because of complete physical and massive psychological discontinuity.”

Buddhist texts that affirm identity across lives still treat it as unlike identity within a single life.

“Moreover, even Buddhist texts that posit trans-life identity do not treat it as completely analogous to identity within a single life.”

In the early stages of the bodhisattva path, the vow is forgotten after death.

“This is because, at least during the early stages of his progress, the vow he takes will be forgotten after his death.32”

• cites [32]Not matched

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The causal continuity of the mental stream is not the same as psychological connections such as memory and continuity of belief and intention.

“This causal continuity of mental aggregates should not, however, be confused with the psychological connections such as memory and continuity of belief and intention stressed in contemporary theories of personal identity.”

Those trans-life identity ascriptions are at least credible.

“What I have argued here is that such ascriptions are at least plausible.”

The Buddhist tradition does not portray the bodhisattva institution in the relay-race way.

“Nevertheless, this is not how the Buddhist tradition depicts the institution of the bodhisattva.”

For Buddhists, conventional identity continuity depends in part on ordinary linguistic and conceptual practices, which are closely connected to psychological continuity.

“This is because, for Buddhists, conventional continuity of identity depends partly on ordinary use of language and concepts, and these will be closely tied to psychological continuity.”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · plain

  “For this reason, concepts like”

Because the body dissolves, memory is lost, and social customs do not span lives, a Buddhist may reasonably treat the reborn person as a closely related but distinct person.

“Given the dissolution of the body, the loss of memory, and the inability of social customs to range over lives, I think it perfectly sensible for the Buddhist to consider the reborn person simply a closely related but different person from the one who has died.”

Past positive karmic actions will ripen into conditions for meeting Buddhism and retaking the vow later.

“One reason this is true is that his positive past karmic actions will ripen into the conditions for encountering Buddhism and retaking his vow in the future.33”

• cites [33]Not matched

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What carries over to future lives is a person's general pattern of affective and emotional response, not necessarily every specific reaction.

“This does not necessarily mean that my specific affective responses in all their idiosyncratic particularity will reoccur in future lives, but my general pattern of affective and emotional reactions will be passed on.”

Buddhist rebirth is like the amnesiac case in occupying a gray area about personal identity.

“The example of the amnesiac suggests that Buddhist rebirth falls into a similar gray area.”

For Buddhists, identity ascriptions depend on conceptual unification by aggregative concepts that are partly rooted in social customs and language.

“Moreover, for Buddhists these concepts (prajñapti) are at least partially rooted in social customs and the way we use language.”

• cites [17]Not matched

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A literal reading of the vow would use the first-person pronoun only for this life and add the wish that future karmically connected lives take up the commitment.

“A literal rendering of the bodhisattva's vow, then, would use the first-person pronoun only to refer to this life, and might perhaps add the aspiration that all future karmically connected lives might also take up this commitment.”

It is doubtful that one can conventionally identify with a being that lacks all physical and psychological continuity, even if doing so is pragmatically useful.

“It is not clear, therefore, that I could in any meaningful way conventionally identify myself with a being that lacked all physical and psychological continuity with me, even if there were pragmatic efficacy in doing so.”

An account of identity that relies only on karmic causal links is not credible for Buddhists.

“For this same reason, a Buddhist theory of identity that focuses only on karmic causal connections will not be plausible.”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · plain

  “Karmic continuity, to the extent that it is divorced from physical and psychological continuity, will not be sufficient for plausible ascriptions of identity.”

For Buddhists, identity across lives requires not only causal continuity but also conceptual designation and identification of future stages as numerically identical to past ones.

“This trans-life gap in presumably identity-relevant continuity necessitates distinguishing between the causal continuity of the mental stream (saṃtāna) that connects one life to the next and continuity of identity itself, which for Buddhists requires both conceptual designation of a person and a further conceptual identification of future stages of the person as being numerically identical to past”

The continuity of deep affective, emotional, and intellectual habitual responses between lives makes it plausible for Buddhists to ascribe identity across lives.

“I argue that this makes cross-life ascriptions of identity plausible, although describing the relationship as one of closely related difference is plausible as well.”

• Also stated in: § Deep Psychological Continuity across Lives · hedged

  “Nevertheless, with these qualifications kept in mind, I think it is at least plausible for Buddhists to ascribe continuity of identity in some sense across lives, on the basis of this deep layer of psychological continuity.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Physical continuity is not required for identity to continue across lives.

Buddhists may extend the ordinary concept of identity across lives if significant alternate psychological continuity remains, despite lacking physical and memory continuity.

“This suggests that even in the absence of physical continuity and presumably identity-relevant psychological continuity like memory, it may be open to Buddhists to extend the ordinary concept of identity across lives provided significant kinds of alternate psychological continuity remain.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Physical continuity is not required for identity to continue across lives.

The bodhisattva is likely to fulfill the vow even after forgetting that he made it.

“The bodhisattva, however, is likely to fulfill his vow, even after he forgets he has made it.”

Buddhist psychology claims that tendencies to feel pleasure or pain in response to stimuli and propensities to react emotionally and intellectually are inherited from past lives.

“Both my tendency to feel pleasure and pain in response to a particular stimulus and my propensity to respond emotionally and intellectually to this compound of sensory input and hedonic affect are inherited from past lives.”

• cites Gethin 1998, p. 216Not matched

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• cites Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995, p. 1134, M iii 285Not matched

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• cites Waldron 2003, p. 33Not matched

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The bodhisattva case resembles a single-life promise to do a task while knowing one will forget, but setting in motion a process that completes the task without memory of the commitment.

“The case is analogous to a person in a single lifetime promising to do a task, knowing he will forget the promise, but initiating a process whereby he will complete the task without remembering his commitment to doing so.”

The proposed account is compatible with the Buddhist teaching that identification with future lives arises from ignorance and causes suffering.

“In the third, I explain why the account I develop does not conflict with the Buddhist view that identifying with our future lives is a result of ignorance and a continuing source of suffering.”

Buddhist metaphysics treats persons as conventional aggregations of causally connected physical and mental events, not as enduring selves.

“Persons are conceptual entities (prajñaptisat), collections of these discrete but causally connected physical and mental events conceptually unified under a conventional designation (prajñapti).”

• cites [5]Not matched

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The pragmatic usefulness of identifying with a future life is not by itself enough to justify ascribing identity across lives.

“Similar considerations also show why a Buddhist cannot successfully claim that trans-life ascriptions of identity can be justified merely by their pragmatic efficacy.”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · plain

  “The point made thus far, however, is that neither karmic continuity nor the pragmatic value of identification alone will suffice to make such ascriptions plausible.”

Without an enduring self, Buddhist identity ascriptions depend on two conceptual unifications: grouping present elements and unifying them over time.

“Instead, for Buddhists, these ascriptions depend on two conceptual unifications.”

Buddhist conventionalist accounts of persons and identity rely on ordinary person-talk, which includes physical and/or psychological continuity.

“A deeper response is to recognize that Buddhist accounts of the conventional existence of persons, as well as continuity of identity, presuppose much of the content of our ordinary ways of talking about persons and personal identity, which will include reference to physical and/or psychological continuity.”

A credible Buddhist account of identity continuity requires some form of psychological continuity.

“Second, at least some kind of psychological continuity will be necessary for a plausible Buddhist theory of continuity of identity.”

Buddhist texts display an ambivalent attitude toward identity across rebirth, sometimes ascribing identity and sometimes difference.

“Śāntideva, for instance, characterizes the bodhisattva vow as a trans-life commitment, but elsewhere claims that the one who is reborn is not the one who dies (Bodhicaryāvatāra 8 : 98).”

• Also stated in: § The Self, Karmic Continuity, and Identity: The Problem of Identity across Lives · hedged

  “Finally, the influential Buddhist characterization of the identity of persons at different times as being neither”

• cites Bodhicaryāvatāra 8 : 98Not matched

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• cites Rhys Davids 1890, p. 63Not matched

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Ordinary people, thinking themselves enduring persons, believe they are a unitary being that travels to another life after death.

“Ordinary people, as a result of thinking of themselves as enduring persons, believe that they exist as a unitary being that travels to another life after death.”

The bodhisattva can therefore view future lives as continuations of the current one without pernicious craving.

“The bodhisattva therefore may view his future lives as continuations of his current one without experiencing the pernicious arising of craving.”

There is significant emotional, affective, and intellectual continuity between lives in the form of deeply rooted habitual response patterns.

“Moreover, significant emotional, affective, and intellectual continuity exists between lives, in the form of deeply rooted patterns of habitual response.”

The same points apply to the collection of physical and mental events unified under a human name.

“Similar remarks apply to the collection of physical and mental events that can be conceptually unified under a human name.”

Many Buddhist texts say craving and suffering arise not from conceptual unification alone but from reifying the unified object as something one can own.

“According to many Buddhist texts, craving and suffering do not arise merely because we conceptually unify discrete entities under a conventional label.Craving arises only when we reify this conceptually unified object, taking it to be a single thing that we can own.”

Buddhist texts describe rebirth not only as human but also as animal, hell-being, deity, and other kinds of beings.

“The second element I want to touch upon is the fact that Buddhist texts describe the possibility of rebirth, not only in human form, but also as an animal, a hell-being, a deity, and various other kinds of beings.”

Buddhists can appeal to this deep psychological continuity to extend the concept of identity across lives.

“I have argued that Buddhists can appeal to this deep level of psychological continuity in extending the concept of identity across lives.”

If that is right, past-life memory does not establish psychological continuity between lives but gives a magical glimpse into an otherwise discontinuous life.

“If this is right, then the remembering of past lives does not establish psychological continuity between past and future lives, but instead provides a magical glimpse into a life that may otherwise be discontinuous from the present one.”

Advanced practitioners may still regard themselves as conceptually unified aggregations of mental and physical events that fit social practices and help remove suffering.

“Nevertheless, advanced practitioners may continue to think of themselves as conceptually unified aggregations of mental and physical events that, like chariots, fit into social practices and provide the useful function of removing suffering.”

This explains how highly realized persons can see themselves as conventionally enduring through one life.

“This explains how highly realized persons may view themselves as conventionally enduring throughout one life.”

An advanced practitioner can still conceptually unify chariot parts under the label 'chariot' to interact skillfully with the collection.

“An advanced practitioner can still conceptually unify these discrete chariot parts under the designation”

• cites [35]Not matched

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Overemphasizing past-life recollection would create an odd situation where only practitioners with the power are identified with past lives while others are not.

“Placing too much emphasis on it would result in an odd situation in which certain Buddhist practitioners who attain the power are conventionally identified with their past lives, while all other persons are not.”

Given deep psychological continuity across lives, ascriptions of identity and commitment across lifetimes are also intelligible.

“As I have argued in the previous section, based on the deep layer of psychological continuity spanning lives, ascriptions of identity and commitment across lifetimes are also intelligible.”

If trans-lifetime identification lacks sufficient conventional robustness, the bodhisattva's vow becomes mere hyperbole taken seriously only by deluded beginners on the path.

“If we cannot take trans-lifetime identification with the right amount of conventional robustness, however, it becomes simply a moment of hyperbole taken seriously only by deluded persons at the beginning of the Buddhist path.43”

• cites [43]Not matched

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Given such trans-life identifications, the bodhisattva may coherently make a vow that binds future lifetimes to the project of enlightenment and removing suffering.

“Moreover, based on such trans-life identifications, the bodhisattva may coherently take a vow binding together his future lifetimes in the project of achieving enlightenment and removing suffering.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The bodhisattva's vow is to perfect the virtues of full Buddhahood for the benefit of all beings.

The phenomenology of past-life memory in Buddhism may be almost entirely unlike ordinary memory, so examining a past life would resemble looking into another person's mind.

“What this suggests is that the phenomenology of past-life memory in the Buddhist tradition may be almost wholly distinct from ordinary memory, so much so that examining one's past life would be akin to looking into the mind of another person.41”

• cites [41]Not matched

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Buddhist texts usually list past-life recollection with other higher powers such as teleportation, flying, and mind-reading.

“The second reason is that Buddhist texts typically place the power of recollecting past lives alongside a number of other higher powers, including teleportation, flying, and, most significantly, reading other people's minds.40”

• cites [40]Not matched

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There are two importantly different ways to identify with one's future states.

“There are, however, two importantly different ways of identifying with one's future states.”

Buddhist accounts of persons as conceptually unified aggregations imply that there will be some unproblematic indeterminacy about when identity continuity holds.

“Buddhist accounts of persons as conceptually unified aggregations entails that there will be some unproblematic indeterminacy over when continuity of identity holds.”

In Jātaka stories where the Buddha appears in animal forms, he is almost always described as developing one or more Buddhahood virtues.

“It is worth noting, however, that in Jātaka stories in which the Buddha is portrayed in a variety of animal forms, he is almost always described as developing one or more of the virtues of Buddhahood.”

Past-life recollections do not play a serious role in determining whether identity across lives is intelligible.

“There are two reasons I do not think these recollections play a serious role in determining the intelligibility of ascribing identity across lives.”

The karmic and psychological force of positive actions in one lifetime makes it likely that the bodhisattva continues perfecting the virtues in future lives even if he forgets the vow.

“Moreover, as a result of the karmic and psychological force of positive actions in a particular lifetime, it is likely the bodhisattva will continue the project of perfecting the virtues in future lives, even if he forgets taking the vow itself.”

Without an enduring self, Buddhists use causal continuity among mental and physical aggregates to explain conventional persons, identity within lives, and karmic continuity within and between lives.

“In the absence of an enduring self, Buddhists appeal to causal continuity between mental and physical aggregates to explain the conventional existence of persons, continuity of identity within lives, and karmic continuity both within and between lives.”

It is unclear how much past-life recollection can contribute to identity across lives, since almost all ordinary people and many advanced Buddhists never experience it.

“It is not clear, then, how much of a role this particular power can play in identity across lives, given that almost all ordinary persons, and even many advanced Buddhists, never experience it.”