Antiviral Resistance and the Control of Pandemic Influenza
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Abstract
BACKGROUND: The response to the next influenza pandemic will likely include extensive use of antiviral drugs (mainly oseltamivir), combined with other transmission-reducing measures. Animal and in vitro studies suggest that some strains of influenza may become resistant to oseltamivir while maintaining infectiousness (fitness). Use of antiviral agents on the scale anticipated for the control of pandemic influenza will create an unprecedented selective pressure for the emergence and spread of these strains. Nonetheless, antiviral resistance has received little attention when evaluating these plans. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We designed and analyzed a deterministic compartmental model of the transmission of oseltamivir-sensitive and -resistant influenza infections during a pandemic. The model predicts that even if antiviral treatment or prophylaxis leads to the emergence of a transmissible resistant strain in as few as 1 in 50,000 treated persons and 1 in 500,000 prophylaxed persons, widespread use of antivirals may strongly promote the spread of resistant strains at the population level, leading to a prevalence of tens of percent by the end of a pandemic. On the other hand, even in circumstances in which a resistant strain spreads widely, the use of antivirals may significantly delay and/or reduce the total size of the pandemic. If resistant strains carry some fitness cost, then, despite widespread emergence of resistance, antivirals could slow pandemic spread by months or more, and buy time for vaccine development; this delay would be prolonged by nondrug control measures (e.g., social distancing) that reduce transmission, or use of a stockpiled suboptimal vaccine. Surprisingly, the model suggests that such nondrug control measures would increase the proportion of the epidemic caused by resistant strains. CONCLUSIONS: The benefits of antiviral drug use to control an influenza pandemic may be reduced, although not completely offset, by drug resistance in the virus. Therefore, the risk of resistance should be considered in pandemic planning and monitored closely during a pandemic.
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“A mitigated two-phase epidemic may result in a cumulative burden of morbidity and mortality less than that observed in a single unchecked epidemic because of reduced epidemic overshoot (7–9).”
From Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic (2007) · cites this paper as [9]
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“Consistent with the predictions of modeling, the effect of the NPIs in St. Louis appear to have had a less-pronounced effect on CEPID than on peak death rates, and death rates were observed to climb after the NPIs were lifted in mid-November (7–9).”
From Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic (2007) · cites this paper as [9]
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Citations
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“Similar phenomena are observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Streptococcus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36], and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of tuberculosis [37] and malaria [38].”
ResultSelf-citationMonto, A. S., McKimm-Breschkin, J. L., Macken, C., Hampson, A. W., Hay, A., Klimov, A., Tashiro, M., Webster, R. G., Aymard, M., Hayden, F. G., et al. (2006) · Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy · doi:10.1128/aac.01339-05 · Cited by 364 · cited 2×
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“It may be possible to reduce the risk of amplifying resistant viral subpopulations within a treated host [7,8,15,32] by adequate dosing and greater emphasis on prophylaxis than treatment [16].”
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“Graphs (E–G) represent the case when c p ¼ 2 3 10 (cid:2) 4 and c t ¼ 2 3 10 (cid:2) 3 at a fitness cost of 0, 0.2, and 0.4, respectively. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040015.g004 spreading to other hosts [31], and their spread is of the greatest concern.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDistribution of Amantadine‐Resistant H5N1 Avian Influenza Variants in Asia
Cheung, C., Rayner, J. M., Smith, G. J. D., Wang, P., Naipospos, T. S. P., Zhang, J., Yuen, K., Webster, R. G., Peiris, J. S. M., Guan, Y., et al. (2006) · The Journal of Infectious Diseases · doi:10.1086/504723 · Cited by 260 · cited 1×
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“Although two common NI-resistant influenza mutations cause significant fitness deficits in vitro and in vivo, a third (E119V), so far found only in N2 viruses [18], has no detectable fitness cost [20].”
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“Similar phenomena are observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Streptococcus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36], and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of tuberculosis [37] and malaria [38].”
ResultCissé, B., Sokhna, C., Boulanger, D., Milet, J., Bâ, E. H., Richardson, K., Hallett, R., Sutherland, C., Simondon, K., Simondon, F., et al. (2006) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(06)68264-0 · Cited by 209 · cited 1×
“Similar phenomena are observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Streptococcus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36], and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of tuberculosis [37] and malaria [ 38 ].”
ResultThe rise and fall of antimicrobial resistance
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“Once resistant strains have appeared, their ability to spread to many other hosts in the population depends on whether antiviral use provides a sufficiently strong selective force to offset the ’’fitness cost’’ of resistance [13,14].”
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ResultCohen, T., Lipsitch, M., Walensky, R. P., & Murray, M. B. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0600349103 · Cited by 144 · cited 1×
“Similar phenomena are observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Streptococcus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36], and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of tuberculosis [37] and malaria [38].”
ResultSelf-citationEmergence of Drug Resistance during an Influenza Epidemic: Insights from a Mathematical Model
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BackgroundResultBiologic Potential of Amantadine-Resistant Influenza A Virus in an Avian Model
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“…were initially susceptible to adaman-tanes, widespread use these agents would likely select for resistance extremely rapidly [10], because rates of de novo emergence are considerably higher [8] for these agents than for NIs, whereas fitness costs for adamantane resistance are unmeasurable [40].”
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“In other infections such as HIV and tuberculosis, the frequent presence of fitness costs in resistant mutants [21–23] does not prevent transmission of resistant variants in the population[21,24].”
BackgroundResistance to Protease Inhibitors
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“, [6]) suggests that NIs may be more efficacious than assumed in previous models of pandemic control.”
BackgroundNucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor Resistance
Loveday, C. (2001) · JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes · doi:10.1097/00042560-200103011-00003 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“In other infections such as HIV and tuberculosis, the frequent presence of fitness costs in resistant mutants [21–23] does not prevent transmission of resistant variants in the population[21,24].”
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“Similar phenomena are observed in models of Mycobacterium tuberculosis [34], Streptococcus pneumoniae [35], and hospital-acquired infections [36], and are of concern when considering preventive treatment of tuberculosis [37] and malaria [38].”
ResultSelf-citationOseltamivir-resistant influenza?
Moscona, A. (2004) · The Lancet · doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(04)16947-x · Cited by 50 · cited 1×
“It may be possible to reduce the risk of amplifying resistant viral subpopulations within a treated host [7,8,15, 32 ] by adequate dosing and greater emphasis on prophylaxis than treatment [16].”
Background
Cited by
Public health interventions and epidemic intensity during the 1918 influenza pandemic
Hatchett, R. J., Mecher, C. E., & Lipsitch, M. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0610941104 · Cited by 778
Self-citationMathematical epidemiology: Past, present, and future
Brauer, F. (2017) · Infectious Disease Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.idm.2017.02.001 · Cited by 407
“A recent epidemic model (Xiao, Brauer, & Moghadas, 2016) has exhibited such behavior and suggested that there may be an optimal treatment rate for minimizing the final size (Lipsitch et al., 2007; Moghadas, 2008; Moghadas et al., 2008).”
BackgroundModeling influenza epidemics and pandemics: insights into the future of swine flu (H1N1)
Coburn, B. J., Wagner, B. G., & Blower, S. (2009) · BMC Medicine · doi:10.1186/1741-7015-7-30 · Cited by 373
“Models have also been used to compare the relative effectiveness of prophylaxis versus treatment strategies [24], to assess the potential problem of antiviral resistance [26-31] and to identify the optimal strategy for allocating vaccines [25].”
MethodTaguwa, S., Maringer, K., Li, X., Bernal-Rubio, D., Rauch, J. N., Gestwicki, J. E., Andino, R., Fernandez-Sesma, A., & Frydman, J. (2015) · Cell · doi:10.1016/j.cell.2015.10.046 · Cited by 270
“The effectiveness of antivirals is severely limited by the emergence and spread of resistance (Lipsitch et al., 2007).”
Kelso, J. K., Milne, G. J., & Kelly, H. (2009) · BMC Public Health · doi:10.1186/1471-2458-9-117 · Cited by 260
“Their use in an influenza pandemic is however an untested strategy: more experience is needed to determine their likely effectiveness and optimal use, especially given the possibility of the development of antiviral drug resistance during or prior to a pandemic [17-19].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Lipsitch, M., Cohen, T., Murray, M., & Levin, B. R.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lipsitch, Marc
- Venue
- PLoS Medicine
- Publisher
- Public Library of Science (PLoS)
- Published
- 2007-01-23
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- e15
- ISSN
- 1549-1277 (ISSN-L)
- 1549-1676
- PMC
- PMC1779817
- OpenAlex
- W2157231968
- Cited by
- 209
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 15 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 19.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- PLoS Medicine (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health (5u01gm076497-03, 5U01GM076497, 7k08ai055985-02)
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (U01GM076497, 5U01GM076497, R01GM091875)
- National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (R01AI040662, K08-AI055985, R01 AI40662)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Epidemiology › Influenza Virus Research Studies
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Infectious Diseases › Antibiotic Use and Resistance
- Keywords
- antiviral resistance, pandemic influenza, oseltamivir, drug-resistant influenza, transmission dynamics, compartmental epidemic model, fitness cost of resistance, antiviral prophylaxis, social distancing, pandemic preparedness
- MeSH terms
- Antiviral Agents, Computer Simulation, Disease Outbreaks, Humans, Influenza, Human, Orthomyxoviridae, Planning Techniques, Drug Resistance, Viral, Oseltamivir
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