Cited by 29Smart Grid Security and ResilienceIndustrial Automation and Control SystemsInformation and Cyber Security

LICSTER – A Low-cost ICS Security Testbed for Education and Research

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Sauer, Felix, Niedermaier, Matthias, Kießling, Susanne, Merli, Dominik·2019·Electronic Workshops in Computing

Abstract

Unnoticed by most people, Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) control entire productions and critical infrastructures such as water distribution, smart grid and automotive manufacturing. Due to the ongoing digitalization, these systems are becoming more and more connected in order to enable remote control and monitoring. However, this shift bears significant risks, namely a larger attack surface, which can be exploited by attackers. In order to make these systems more secure, it takes research, which is, however, difficult to conduct on productive systems, since these often have to operate twenty-four-seven. Testbeds are mostly very expensive or based on simulation with no real-world physical process. In this paper, we introduce LICSTER, an open-source low-cost ICS testbed, which enables researchers and students to get hands-on experience with industrial security for about 500 Euro. We provide all necessary material to quickly start ICS hacking, with the focus on low-cost and open-source for education and research.

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  • VSSCADA demonstrated their approach by simulating real-world critical infrastructures.

    “They also demonstrated their approach by simulating real-world critical infrastructures.”

    From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [117]

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  1. Foley, S. N., Autrel, F., Bourget, E., Cledel, T., Grunenwald, S., Rubio Hernan, J., Kabil, A., Larsen, R., Rooney, V. M. and Vanhulst, K. (2018), Science Hackathons for Cyberphysical System Security Research: Putting CPS testbed platforms to good use, in 'Proceedings of the 2018 Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy', ACM, pp. 102-107.
  2. Formby, D., Rad, M. and Beyah, R. (2018), Lowering the Barriers to Industrial Control System Security with {GRFICS}, in '2018 {USENIX} Workshop on Advances in Security Education ({ASE} 18)'.
  3. Niedermaier, M., Fischer, F. and von Bodisco, A. (2017), PropFuzz -An IT-security Fuzzing Framework for Proprietary ICS Protocols, in '2017 International Conference on Applied Electronics (AE), Pilsen', pp. 1-4.
  4. Niedermaier, M., Malchow, J.-O., Fischer, F., Marzin, D., Merli, D., Roth, V. and von Bodisco, A. (2018), You Snooze, You Lose: Measuring PLC Cycle Times under Attacks, in '12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 18)'.
  5. Renjie, H., Feng, L. and Dongbo, P. (2010), Research on OPC UA Security, in '2010 5th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications'.
  6. Zhu, B. and Sastry, S. (2010), SCADA-specific Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems: A Survey and Taxonomy, in 'Proceedings of the 1st workshop on secure control systems (SCS)', Vol. 11, p. 7.

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Authors
Sauer, F., Niedermaier, M., Kießling, S., & Merli, D.
Affiliations
Technische Hochschule Augsburg (DE)
Venue
Electronic Workshops in Computing
Published
2019
ISSN
1477-9358 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2975610256
Cited by
29
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 2
FWCI
5.03
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Electronic workshops in computing (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
industrial control systems, ICS security, security testbed, low-cost hardware, open-source hardware, critical infrastructure

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