The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Welfare and Rational Care
Abstract
What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Strawson, P. F. (1962) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 3,223
SCANLON, T. M. (2000) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv134vmrn · Cited by 3,041
Smith, M. (1994) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,376
Wispé, L. (1991) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-6779-7 · Cited by 208
Cited by
The Heart of Justice: Care ethics and Political Theory
Engster, D. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199214358.001.0001 · Cited by 370
‘Autism and the good life’: a new approach to the study of well-being
Rodogno, R., Krause-Jensen, K., & Ashcroft, R. E. (2016) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103595 · Cited by 100
The many faces of hedonic adaptation
Klausen, S. H., Emiliussen, J., Christiansen, R., Hasandedic-Dapo, L., & Engelsen, S. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2021.1967308 · Cited by 21
The situationist critique of virtue ethics
Sreenivasan, G. (2013) · The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics · doi:10.1017/cco9780511734786.014 · Cited by 19
Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing
Klausen, S. H. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2018.1529619 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Darwall, S.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2002-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W1535673142
- Cited by
- 504
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 8.62
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Welfare and Rational Care. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1515/9781400825325
- The paper
- Darwall, S. (2002). Welfare and Rational Care. Princeton University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400825325
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.