The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reasons without Rationalism
Abstract
Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism , Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.
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Citations
Cites
The Humean Theory of Motivation
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Stampe, D. W. (1987) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185225 · Cited by 446
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Sreenivasan, G. (2002) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/111.441.47 · Cited by 326
The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy
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The Problem of Weakness of Will
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Accidie , Evaluation, and Motivation
Tenenbaum, S. (2003) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199257361.003.0007 · Cited by 22
The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning
Wedgwood, R. (1998) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/096725598342109 · Cited by 19
Cited by
On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit
Frost, K. (2014) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2749720 · Cited by 320
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1
Ross, J., & Schroeder, M. (2014) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00552.x · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Setiya, K.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2009-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W586682465
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 28.46
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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