The DOI matches its Crossref record.
3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions
Abstract
In common value auction experiments, individual judgment errors significantly alter market outcomes relative to standard economic formulations. Experienced bidders show sensitivity to the strategic considerations underlying the auction but not to item valuation considerations. Nash equilibrium models accurately characterize auctions with small numbers of bidders_(3-4). However, auctions with large numbers_(6-7) produce more aggressive bidding, resulting in negative profits, the winner's curse. Public informationreducing value uncertainty raises seller's revenues in the absence of a winner's curse, but reduces revenue in its presence. Similarities between laboratory and field data from outer continental shelf lease sales are discussed.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Board connections and M&A transactions
Cai, Y., & Sevilir, M. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.017 · Cited by 647
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
Rothkopf, M. H., Teisberg, T. J., & Kahn, E. P. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261670 · Cited by 383
BUBBLES AND FADS IN ASSET PRICES
Camerer, C. (1989) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.1989.tb00056.x · Cited by 294
Studying the Accuracy of Managers' Perceptions: A Research Odyssey
Mezias, J. M., & Starbuck, W. H. (2003) · British Journal of Management · doi:10.1111/1467-8551.00259 · Cited by 272
The Anterior Cingulate Gyrus Signals the Net Value of Others' Rewards
Apps, M. A. J., & Ramnani, N. (2014) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2701-13.2014 · Cited by 109
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D.
- Venue
- Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2009-12-31
- Pages
- 107-148
- OpenAlex
- W4252521556
- Cited by
- 343
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 32.48
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: 3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1515/9781400830138.107
- The paper
- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2009). 3 The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions. Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830138.107
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.