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The Fixation of Belief
Abstract
Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion arises. The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. The man feels that, if he only holds to his belief without wavering, it will be entirely satisfactory. The willful adherence to a belief, and the arbitrary forcing of it upon others, must, therefore, both be given up and a new method of settling opinions must be adopted, which shall not only produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be believed.
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Citations
Cited by
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On looking into the black box: Prospects and limits in the search for mental models.
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A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements
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Metadata
- Authors
- Peirce, C. S.
- Venue
- Philosophy after Darwin
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2010-12-31
- Pages
- 39-48
- OpenAlex
- W2904206622
- Cited by
- 640
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 511.67
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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