Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
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Abstract
Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority , David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.
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Citations
Cited by
Artificial Intelligence, Values, and Alignment
Gabriel, I. (2020) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-020-09539-2 · Cited by 896
“From an epistemic point of view, it is often thought to lead to better group decisions (Estlund, 2009).”
The threat of algocracy: reality, resistance and accommodation
Danaher, J. (2016) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-015-0211-1 · Cited by 519
“12 I’m not sure that there are any pure instrumentalists, but those who endorse an epistemic theory of democracy certainly emphasise this virtue (Estlund 2008; List & Goodin 2001)”
InfluentialA problem-based approach to democratic theory
WARREN, M. E. (2017) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055416000605 · Cited by 478
Laboratories of Democratic Backsliding
GRUMBACH, J. M. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055422000934 · Cited by 135
“Liberal democracy captures whether a society protects civil rights and liberties (Brettschneider 2010; Estlund 2009), especially for minority populations who have been historically subjugated (Glaude 2017; Shelby 2005).”
Democracy, epistemic agency, and AI: political epistemology in times of artificial intelligence
Coeckelbergh, M. (2023) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-022-00239-4 · Cited by 115
Metadata
- Authors
- Estlund, D. M.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2009-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4256483923
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.15
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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