The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Calculus of Selfishness
Abstract
How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. The Calculus of Selfishness looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation. Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions. Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, The Calculus of Selfishness analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Second, they are sensitive to errors that involve either punishing cooperators or not punishing free-riders23,30.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [23]
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–400 of 569
Yu, Q., Fang, D., Zhang, X., Jin, C., & Ren, Q. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep28585 · Cited by 16
Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games
Battu, B., & Srinivasan, N. (2020) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.191567 · Cited by 15
Allchin, D. (2011) · The American Biology Teacher · doi:10.1525/abt.2011.73.2.14 · Cited by 15
Directed migration shapes cooperation in spatial ecological public goods games
Funk, F., & Hauert, C. (2019) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006948 · Cited by 18
Dynamics of Fairness in Groups of Autonomous Learning Agents
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., Melo, F. S., Paiva, A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46882-2_7 · Cited by 15
Fixation of strategies driven by switching probabilities in evolutionary games
Xu, Z., Zhang, J., Zhang, C., & Chen, Z. (2016) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/116/58002 · Cited by 15
Trust AI regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation
Alalawi, Z., Bova, P., Cimpeanu, T., Stefano, A. D., Duong, M. H., Domingos, E. F., Han, T. A., Krellner, M., Ogbo, N. B., Powers, S. T., et al. (2025) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2025.129627 · Cited by 27
Effects of stochastic games on evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
Zhang, Y., Feng, M., Li, Q., Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2026) · Communications Physics · doi:10.1038/s42005-026-02536-4 · Cited by 14
LaCroix, T., & Mohseni, A. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03763-2 · Cited by 18
Evolution of cooperation in multichannel games on multiplex networks
Basak, A., & Sengupta, S. (2024) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012678 · Cited by 15
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory and Two-Person Games
Gracia-Lázaro, C., Florı́a, L. M., & Moreno, Y. (2017) · Games · doi:10.3390/g8010001 · Cited by 14
Individual perception dynamics in drunk games
Antonioni, A., Martínez-Vaquero, L. A., Mathis, C., Peel, L., & Stella, M. (2019) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.99.052311 · Cited by 12
Mixing protocols in the public goods game
Duh, M., Gosak, M., & Perc, M. (2020) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.102.032310 · Cited by 16
Chen, X., Wang, L., & Fu, F. (2022) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ac932d · Cited by 14
Emergence of cooperation via intention recognition, commitment and apology – A research summary
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2015) · AI Communications · doi:10.3233/aic-150672 · Cited by 14
Edited ethics: corporate governance and Kant's philosophy
McNutt, P. A. (2010) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/03068291011070417 · Cited by 14
Replicator dynamics with diffusion on multiplex networks
Requejo, R. J., & Dı́az-Guilera, A. (2016) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.94.022301 · Cited by 14
Evolutionary Dynamics of Coordinated Cooperation
Ohtsuki, H. (2018) · Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.3389/fevo.2018.00062 · Cited by 13
Moral reasoning and moral competence as predictors of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma
Miranda-Rodríguez, R. A., Leenen, I., Han, H., Palafox, G. P., & García-Rodríguez, G. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-30314-7 · Cited by 13
Frequency-dependent returns in nonlinear public goods games
Hauert, C., & McAvoy, A. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0334 · Cited by 13
Ordali, E., Marcos-Prieto, P., Avvenuti, G., Ricciardi, E., Boncinelli, L., Pietrini, P., Bernardi, G., & Bilancini, E. (2024) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2404213121 · Cited by 13
Modes of migration and multilevel selection in evolutionary multiplayer games
Pichugin, Y., Gokhale, C. S., García, J. A., Traulsen, A., & Rainey, P. B. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.09.027 · Cited by 11
Bilateral costly expulsions resolve the public goods dilemma
Wang, X., & Perc, M. (2021) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2021.0627 · Cited by 12
Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory
Uchida, S., Yamamoto, H., Okada, I., & Sasaki, T. (2019) · Games · doi:10.3390/g10010011 · Cited by 15
Statistics of the number of equilibria in random social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation
Duong, M. H., & Han, T. A. (2021) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00181-0 · Cited by 13
The evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous networks when opponents can be distinguished
Wardil, L. L., & da Silva, J. K. L. (2011) · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical · doi:10.1088/1751-8113/44/34/345101 · Cited by 14
Cooperation without punishment
Battu, B., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-023-28372-y · Cited by 12
Inequality-induced emotions might promote cooperation in evolutionary games
Wang, J., Zhang, L., Li, H., Dai, Q., & Yang, J. (2023) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/s10051-023-00508-z · Cited by 12
Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind
Max Kleiman-weiner, A., Vientós, A., Rand, D. G., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2025) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2400993122 · Cited by 18
Payoff components and their effects in a spatial three-strategy evolutionary social dilemma
Vukov, J., Varga, L., Allen, B., Nowak, M. A., & Szabó, G. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.92.012813 · Cited by 12
Intention-Based Decision Making with Evolution Prospection
Han, T. A., & Pereira, L. M. (2011) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24769-9_19 · Cited by 12
Navigating the landscape of multiplayer games
Omidshafiei, S., Tuyls, K., Czarnecki, W. M., Santos, F. C., Rowland, M., Connor, J. T., Hennes, D., Müller, P. F., Pérolat, J., Vylder, B. D., et al. (2020) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 12
Social Learning in the Ultimatum Game
Zhang, B. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0074540 · Cited by 12
Separation of cyclic and starlike hierarchical dominance in evolutionary matrix games
Szabó, G., Bodó, K. S., & Samani, K. A. (2017) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.95.012320 · Cited by 12
Counterfactual Thinking in Cooperation Dynamics
Pereira, L. M., & Santos, F. C. (2019) · Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-32722-4_5 · Cited by 12
Social dilemma in the external immune system of the red flour beetle? It is a matter of time
Gokhale, C. S., Traulsen, A., & Joop, G. (2017) · Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.1002/ece3.3198 · Cited by 12
Alalawi, Z., Zeng, Y., & Han, T. A. (2020) · EAI Endorsed Transactions on Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems · doi:10.4108/eai.21-10-2020.166668 · Cited by 11
Cooperation among unequal players with aspiration-driven learning
Chen, F., Zhou, L., & Wang, L. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2023.0723 · Cited by 11
Who is a Leader in the Leading Eight? Indirect Reciprocity under Private Assessment
Fujimoto, Y., & Ohtsuki, H. (2024) · PRX Life · doi:10.1103/prxlife.2.023009 · Cited by 12
Static cooperator-defector patterns in models of the snowdrift game played on cycle graphs
Laird, R. A. (2013) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.88.012105 · Cited by 11
Evolutionary games with coordination and self-dependent interactions
Király, B., & Szabó, G. (2017) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.95.012303 · Cited by 11
The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks
Sasaki, T., Yamamoto, H., Okada, I., & Uchida, S. (2017) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 12
Centralized versus Personalized Commitments and Their Influence on Cooperation in Group Interactions
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Martínez-Vaquero, L. A., & Lenaerts, T. (2017) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10704 · Cited by 17
Between Local and Global Strategy Updating in Public Goods Game
Wang, C., & Huang, C. (2022) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2022.128097 · Cited by 10
Congestion phenomena caused by matching pennies in evolutionary games
Szabó, G., & Szolnoki, A. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.032110 · Cited by 10
Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game
LaPorte, P., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010987 · Cited by 12
Liu, X.-S., Wu, Z.-X., Chen, M. Z. Q., & Guan, J. (2017) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2017-80219-0 · Cited by 10
Sentiment contagion dilutes prisoner's dilemmas on social networks
Li, K., Wei, Z., & Cong, R. (2020) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/128/38002 · Cited by 10
Babajanyan, S. G., Lin, W. T., & Cheong, K. H. (2020) · Advanced Science · doi:10.1002/advs.202001995 · Cited by 10
Shifts in evolutionary balance of phenotypes under environmental changes
Kleshnina, M., McKerral, J. C., González‐Tokman, C., Filar, J. A., & Mitchell, J. G. (2022) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.220744 · Cited by 10
Evolutionary games combining two or three pair coordinations on a square lattice
Király, B., & Szabó, G. (2017) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.96.042101 · Cited by 10
Stationary frequencies and mixing times for neutral drift processes with spatial structure
McAvoy, A., Adlam, B., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2018.0238 · Cited by 10
Influence of small-world topology and time-scale in evolutionary Kuramoto dilemma
Liu, X.-S., Wu, Z.-X., & Guan, J. (2018) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/122/20001 · Cited by 9
Computational Behavioral Models for Public Goods Games on Social Networks
Tomassini, M., & Antonioni, A. (2019) · Games · doi:10.3390/g10030035 · Cited by 9
Limited memory optimizes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
Ma, S., Zhang, B., Cao, S., Liu, J. S., & Wang, W.-X. (2021) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.210653 · Cited by 9
Altruistic behaviors and cooperation among gifted adolescents
Salem, A. A. M. S., Abdelsattar, M., Al-Diyar, M. A., Al-Hwailah, A. H., Derar, E., Al-Hamdan, N. A. H., & Tilwani, S. A. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.945766 · Cited by 15
Altruistische Reziprozität. Theoretische Überlegungen und experimentelle Evidenz
Berger, R. D. (2013) · KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie · doi:10.1007/s11577-013-0192-y · Cited by 10
Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models
Mesterton‐Gibbons, M., & Sherratt, T. N. (2011) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-011-0017-4 · Cited by 9
Clustering in Large Networks Does Not Promote Upstream Reciprocity
Masuda, N. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025190 · Cited by 9
Sampling Dynamics of a Symmetric Ultimatum Game
Miȩkisz, J., & Ramsza, M. (2012) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-012-0064-5 · Cited by 9
Bridging Two Realms of Machine Ethics
Pereira, L. M., & Saptawijaya, A. (2015) · Advances in human and social aspects of technology book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-4666-8592-5.ch010 · Cited by 9
Pereira, L. M. (2012) · Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29928-5_14 · Cited by 9
Dasgupta, N., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-025-09698-5 · Cited by 8
“However, the development of socially intelligent agents is challenging, as cooperation is a complex cognitive skill [25] and the mechanisms influencing its evolution are still not well understood [3, 4], despite being extensively studied in the past [8, 29, 30, 43].”
Public Goods Games in Disease Evolution and Spread
Morison, C., Fic, M., Marcou, T., Mohamadichamgavi, J., Antón, J., Sayyar, G., Stein, A., Bastian, F., Krakovská, H., Krishnan, N., et al. (2025) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00619-5 · Cited by 8
Symmetry warrants rational cooperation by co-action in Social Dilemmas
Sasidevan, V., & Sitabhra Sinha, A. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep13071 · Cited by 8
Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
Murase, Y., & Baek, S. K. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217 · Cited by 8
No Need for Conspiracy: Self-Organized Cartel Formation in a Modified Trust Game
Peixoto, T. P., & Bornholdt, S. (2012) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.108.218702 · Cited by 8
Miao, Q., Wang, J., Hu, M., Zhang, F., Zhang, Q.-S., & Xia, C. (2014) · The European Physical Journal Plus · doi:10.1140/epjp/i2014-14008-4 · Cited by 8
Periodic frequencies of the cycles in 2 × 2 games: evidence from experimental economics
Xu, B., Wang, S., & Wang, Z. (2014) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2014-31074-2 · Cited by 8
Heuristics Guide the Implementation of Social Preferences in One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma ExperimentsPreprint
Capraro, V., Jordan, J., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2429862 · Cited by 8
Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory
Glynatsi, N. E., McAvoy, A., & Hilbe, C. (2024) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2023.2493 · Cited by 6
Power asymmetry destabilizes reciprocal cooperation in social dilemmas
Colnaghi, M., Santos, F. P., Lange, P. A. M. V., & Balliet, D. P. (2025) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2025.112106 · Cited by 8
Cimpeanu, T., Pereira, L. M., & Han, T. A. (2025) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2025.0164 · Cited by 11
Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
Cressman, R., & Vlastimil Křivan, A. (2021) · Journal of Dynamics and Games · doi:10.3934/jdg.2021030 · Cited by 7
Spontaneous symmetry breaking of cooperation between species
Hauert, C., & Szabó, G. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae326 · Cited by 7
Tend to one's own house: The effect of firm CSR on employee effort
Douthit, J. D., Mao, Z., & Martin, P. R. (2024) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12987 · Cited by 6
Dynamics of cooperation in concurrent games
Rossetti, C. S. L., Hauser, O., & Hilbe, C. (2025) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-025-56083-7 · Cited by 7
Stable leaders pave the way for cooperation under time-dependent exploration rates
Pinheiro, F. L., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2021) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.200910 · Cited by 5
Dynamics of social balance on networks: The emergence of multipolar societies
Manshour, P., & Montakhab, A. (2021) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.104.034303 · Cited by 7
Arnhart, L. (2010) · Politics and the Life Sciences · doi:10.2990/29_1_24 · Cited by 7
Datenplattformen, Datenräume und (Daten-)Ökosysteme – Einordnung und strategische Aspekte
Strnadl, C. F., & Schöning, H. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-67556-4_2 · Cited by 7
Varga, L., Vukov, J., & Szabó, G. (2014) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.90.042920 · Cited by 7
Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning
Realpe-Gomez, J., Szczesny, B., Dall’Asta, L., & Galla, T. (2012) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2012/10/p10022 · Cited by 7
Good strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: Smale vs. Markov
Akin, E. (2017) · Journal of Dynamics and Games · doi:10.3934/jdg.2017014 · Cited by 7
Persistence probability of a random polynomial arising from evolutionary game theory
Can, V. H., Duong, M. H., & Pham, V. H. (2019) · Journal of Applied Probability · doi:10.1017/jpr.2019.50 · Cited by 7
The prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous imitation capability
Wu, T., Wang, H., Yang, J. Y., Xu, L., Li, Y., & Zhang, J. (2018) · International Journal of Modern Physics C · doi:10.1142/s0129183118500778 · Cited by 7
Imitating Contributed Players Promotes Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Wang, X., Luo, C., Ding, S., & Wang, J. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2870340 · Cited by 7
Evolutionary public goods game on the birandom geometric graph
Li, Y., Sun, H., Han, W., & Xiong, W. (2020) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.101.042303 · Cited by 7
Duong, M. H., Durbac, C. M., & Han, T. A. (2024) · Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s11538-024-01344-7 · Cited by 6
Discipline and punishment in panoptical public goods games
Botta, R., Blanco, G. A., & Schaerer, C. E. (2024) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-024-57842-0 · Cited by 6
Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom
Pence, C. H., & Buchak, L. (2012) · Evolution Education and Outreach · doi:10.1007/s12052-012-0434-x · Cited by 6
Bai, M., Chen, M., Zhang, L., Duan, Y., & Zhou, S. (2022) · Water · doi:10.3390/w14162564 · Cited by 6
Evolutionary dynamics for persistent cooperation in structured populations
Li, Y., Liu, X., Claussen, J. C., & Guo, W. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.062802 · Cited by 6
Targeted Cooperative Actions Shape Social Networks
Wardil, L. L., & Hauert, C. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147850 · Cited by 6
Co-action provides rational basis for the evolutionary success of Pavlovian strategies
Sasidevan, V., & Sitabhra Sinha, A. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep30831 · Cited by 6
The influence of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation
Li, X., Geng, Y., Shen, C., & Ши, Л. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-50451-2 · Cited by 6
Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
Murase, Y., & Baek, S. K. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-70281-x · Cited by 6
Okada, I., Yamamoto, H., & Uchida, S. (2020) · Games · doi:10.3390/g11010013 · Cited by 6
Explaining workers’ inactivity in social colonies from first principles
Khajehnejad, M. A., García, J., & Meyer, B. E. (2023) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2022.0808 · Cited by 5
Dynamic Structure of Competition Networks in Affordable Care Act Insurance Market
Gianetto, D. A., Mosleh, M., & Heydari, B. (2018) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2018.2800659 · Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Sigmund, K.
- Corresponding author
- Sigmund, Karl
- ORCID
- Sigmund, Karl
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2010-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W3146032046
- Cited by
- 570
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 44 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 46 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 43.94
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Economics Books (submittedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- cooperation, selfishness, social dilemmas, evolutionary game theory, reciprocity, reputation, prisoner's dilemma, trust game, ultimatum game, snowdrift game, public goods, social traps, collective action, self-interest
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
