The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Calculus of Selfishness
Abstract
How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. The Calculus of Selfishness looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation. Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions. Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, The Calculus of Selfishness analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Second, they are sensitive to errors that involve either punishing cooperators or not punishing free-riders23,30.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [23]
Citations
Cites
Still being checked.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 101–200 of 569
A novel route to cyclic dominance in voluntary social dilemmas
Guo, H., Song, Z., Geček, S., Li, X., Jusup, M., Perc, M., Moreno, Y., Boccaletti, S., & Wang, Z. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2019.0789 · Cited by 70
Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 73
Apology and forgiveness evolve to resolve failures in cooperative agreements
Martínez-Vaquero, L. A., Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep10639 · Cited by 76
Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2016) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004709 · Cited by 77
Disentangling social and group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on complex networks
Gómez‐Gardeñes, J., Vilone, D., & Sánchez, A. (2011) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/95/68003 · Cited by 64
Kraak, S. (2010) · Fish and Fisheries · doi:10.1111/j.1467-2979.2010.00372.x · Cited by 75
Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games
Sasaki, T., & Uchida, S. (2014) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903 · Cited by 71
Zhang, J., Zhang, C., Chu, T., & Perc, M. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787 · Cited by 72
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M., & Wang, L. (2012) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.85.066133 · Cited by 70
Aspiration promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with the imitation rule
Liu, X., He, M., Kang, Y., & Pan, Q. (2016) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.94.012124 · Cited by 70
The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Kleshnina, M., Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 · Cited by 70
EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER COLLECTIVE-RISK DILEMMAS
Santos, F. C., de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., Santos, M. D., NEVES, P. N. B., & Pacheco, J. M. (2011) · Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1142/s0218202511400045 · Cited by 67
Intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation
Anh, H. T., Pereira, L. M., & Santos, F. C. (2011) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712311410896 · Cited by 69
Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks
Battiston, F., Perc, M., & Latora, V. (2017) · University of Maribor digital library (University of Maribor) · Cited by 67
The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
Zhang, B., Li, C., Silva, H. D., Bednarik, P., & Sigmund, K. (2013) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7 · Cited by 67
Self-citationFrom Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks
Pinheiro, F. L., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032114 · Cited by 63
Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
Grujić, J., Eke, B., Antonio Cabrales, Y., Cuesta, J. A., & Sánchez, Á. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00638 · Cited by 61
Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
Baek, S. K., Jeong, H.-C., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep25676 · Cited by 65
Han, T. A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2022.0036 · Cited by 66
Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2015) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/110/38003 · Cited by 64
Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
Duong, M. H., & Han, T. A. (2021) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2021.0568 · Cited by 68
Engineering Pro-Sociality With Autonomous Agents
Paiva, A., Santos, F. P., & Santos, F. C. (2018) · Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1609/aaai.v32i1.12215 · Cited by 65
Imitate or innovate: Competition of strategy updating attitudes in spatial social dilemma games
Danku, Z., Wang, Z., & Szolnoki, A. (2018) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/121/18002 · Cited by 62
Seasonal payoff variations and the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-49075-3 · Cited by 59
Evolving cooperation in multichannel games
Donahue, K., Hauser, O., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3 · Cited by 64
Hilbe, C. (2010) · Bulletin of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s11538-010-9608-2 · Cited by 58
The evolution of conditional moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
Sasaki, T., Okada, I., & Nakai, Y. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep41870 · Cited by 61
Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2015) · Repository of the Academy's Library (Library of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) · Cited by 58
Mediating artificial intelligence developments through negative and positive incentives
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Lenaerts, T., & Santos, F. C. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244592 · Cited by 66
Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
Han, T. A., Duong, M. H., & Perc, M. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0547 · Cited by 61
GROUP-SIZE DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES
Peña, J. (2011) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01504.x · Cited by 57
Kohler, T. A., Cockburn, D., Hooper, P. L., Bocinsky, R. K., & Kobti, Z. (2011) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s0219525911003256 · Cited by 57
Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas
Pinheiro, F. L., de Vasconcelos, V. V. L., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945 · Cited by 54
Religious Motivations for Cooperation: An Experimental Investigation Using Explicit Primes
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Haque, O. S., Kane, R. J., Nowak, M. A., & Coakley, S. (2012) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2013.775664 · Cited by 60
The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives
Dong, Y., Zhang, B., & Tao, Y. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep28809 · Cited by 61
Zhu, Y., Xia, C., Wang, Z., & Chen, Z. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tnse.2022.3164094 · Cited by 61
Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions
Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y., & Nowak, M. A. (2015) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004527 · Cited by 60
The role of punishment in the spatial public goods game
Zhu, P., Guo, H., Zhang, H., Han, Y., Wang, Z., & Chu, C. (2020) · Nonlinear Dynamics · doi:10.1007/s11071-020-05965-0 · Cited by 57
Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishmentPreprint
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2017) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/198192 · Cited by 55
How selection pressure changes the nature of social dilemmas in structured populations
Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/14/7/073035 · Cited by 56
Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas
Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep09312 · Cited by 54
Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution
Sasaki, T., Okada, I., Uchida, S., & Chen, X. (2015) · Games · doi:10.3390/g6040574 · Cited by 51
What You Gotta Know to Play Good in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Akin, E. (2015) · Games · doi:10.3390/g6030175 · Cited by 49
Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation
Han, T. A., & Tran-Thanh, L. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-34435-2 · Cited by 55
Social evolution leads to persistent corruption
Lee, J.-H., Iwasa, Y., Dieckmann, U., & Sigmund, K. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1900078116 · Cited by 56
Self-citationForgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma
Zagorsky, B. M., Reiter, J. G., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0080814 · Cited by 52
Origin of Peer Influence in Social Networks
Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, M. D., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2014) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.112.098702 · Cited by 53
Emergence of communities and diversity in social networks
Han, X., Cao, S., Shen, Z., Zhang, B., Wang, W.-X., Cressman, R., & Stanley, E. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1608164114 · Cited by 52
Coevolutionary dynamics of aspiration and strategy in spatial repeated public goods games
Wu, T., Fu, F., & Wang, L. (2018) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/aac687 · Cited by 53
Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs
Chen, Y.-T. (2013) · The Annals of Applied Probability · doi:10.1214/12-aap849 · Cited by 55
Learning dynamics explains human behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma on networks
Cimini, G., & Sánchez, Á. (2014) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.1186 · Cited by 53
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50
Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates
Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep37517 · Cited by 50
Reiter, J. G., Hilbe, C., Rand, D. G., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 · Cited by 49
Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations
Roy, S., Chowdhury, S. N., Mali, P. C., Perc, M., & Ghosh, D. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0272719 · Cited by 49
The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
Hilbe, C., Chakra, M. A., Altrock, P. M., & Traulsen, A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066490 · Cited by 50
Disentangling social and group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on complex networks
Gómez-Gardeñes, J., Vilone, D., & Sánchez, A. (2011) · LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) · Cited by 49
Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks
Iyer, S., & Killingback, T. (2016) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004779 · Cited by 47
Bear, A., Kagan, A., & Rand, D. G. (2017) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2016.2326 · Cited by 47
The role of institutional incentives and the exemplar in promoting cooperation
Wu, J., Li, C., Zhang, B., Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep06421 · Cited by 47
Corpus-Based Intention Recognition in Cooperation Dilemmas
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Santos, F. C. (2012) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00072 · Cited by 47
Indirect Reciprocity under Incomplete Observation
Nakamura, M., & Masuda, N. (2011) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113 · Cited by 46
To Regulate or Not: A Social Dynamics Analysis of an Idealised AI Race
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2020) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research · doi:10.1613/jair.1.12225 · Cited by 57
Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding
Pal, S., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-33551-y · Cited by 48
Individual costs and societal benefits of interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic
Traulsen, A., Levin, S. A., & Saad-Roy, C. M. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2303546120 · Cited by 44
Evolutionary dynamics on stochastic evolving networks for multiple-strategy games
Wu, B., Zhou, D., & Wang, L. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.046111 · Cited by 44
Second-Order Reputation Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Dong, Y., Sun, S., Xia, C., & Perc, M. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2922200 · Cited by 46
Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
Emergent behaviours in multi-agent systems with Evolutionary Game Theory
Han, T. A. (2022) · AI Communications · doi:10.3233/aic-220104 · Cited by 48
Evolution of norms for judging social behavior
Kessinger, T. A., Tarnita, C. E., & Plotkin, J. B. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2219480120 · Cited by 48
Vilone, D., Ramasco, J. J., Sánchez, Á., & Miguel, M. S. (2014) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.90.022810 · Cited by 41
Proper aspiration level promotes generous behavior in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Rong, Z., Zhao, Q., Wu, Z.-X., Zhou, T., & Tse, C. K. (2016) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2016-70286-0 · Cited by 42
Social Control and the Social Contract: The Emergence of Sanctioning Systems for Collective Action
Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., & Silva, H. D. (2010) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4 · Cited by 44
Self-citationOpting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation
Zhang, B., Fan, S.-J., Li, C., Zheng, X.-D., Bao, J.-Z., Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep35902 · Cited by 50
Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity
Li, J., Zhao, X., Li, B., Rossetti, C. S. L., Hilbe, C., & Xia, H. (2022) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-022-00334-w · Cited by 39
Generosity Pays in the Presence of Direct Reciprocity: A Comprehensive Study of 2×2 Repeated Games
Martínez-Vaquero, L. A., Cuesta, J. A., & Sánchez, Á. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035135 · Cited by 40
A synergy of costly punishment and commitment in cooperation dilemmas
Han, T. A., & Lenaerts, T. (2016) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712316653451 · Cited by 39
The Cooperative PhenotypePreprint
Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2426473 · Cited by 47
Evolution of collective action in adaptive social structures
Moreira, J. A. G., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01521 · Cited by 41
Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for pairwise collective strategy updates
Szabó, G., Szolnoki, A., Varga, M., & Hanusovszky, L. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.82.026110 · Cited by 38
Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-91532-5 · Cited by 42
Coevolution of Quantum and Classical Strategies on Evolving Random Networks
Li, Q., Iqbal, A., Perc, M., Chen, M., & Abbott, D. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423 · Cited by 38
Imitation dynamics on networks with incomplete information
Wang, X., Zhou, L., McAvoy, A., & Li, A. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-43048-x · Cited by 41
Evolutionary dynamics of N-person Hawk-Dove games
Chen, W., Gracia-Lázaro, C., Li, Z., Wang, L., & Moreno, Y. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-04284-6 · Cited by 39
Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
Chen, X., & Perc, M. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep04161 · Cited by 38
Eleven mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation
Zaggl, M. A. (2013) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137413000374 · Cited by 39
Do good actions inspire good actions in others?
Capraro, V., & Marcelletti, A. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep07470 · Cited by 34
Wu, Z.-X., Rong, Z., & Yang, H.-X. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.012802 · Cited by 37
Cooperation driven by success-driven group formation
Szolnoki, A., & Chen, X. (2016) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.94.042311 · Cited by 36
Okada, I., Sasaki, T., & Nakai, Y. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-09935-2 · Cited by 37
Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the imitation and aspiration-driven update rules
Wang, X., Gu, C., Zhao, J., & Quan, J. (2019) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.100.022411 · Cited by 38
Adherence to public institutions that foster cooperation
Radzvilavicius, A. L., Kessinger, T. A., & Plotkin, J. B. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-23783-9 · Cited by 37
To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-Player Trust Game
Lim, I. S., & Masuda, N. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2023.3244537 · Cited by 36
Evolutionary stability of cooperation in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
Fujimoto, Y., & Ohtsuki, H. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2300544120 · Cited by 38
Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity
Tkadlec, J., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2221080120 · Cited by 38
Replicator dynamics of public goods game with tax-based punishment
Li, M., Kang, H., Sun, X., Shen, Y., & Chen, Q.-Y. (2022) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112747 · Cited by 36
The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds
Hoffman, M., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z · Cited by 35
The competitive advantage of institutional reward
Dong, Y., Sasaki, T., & Zhang, B. (2019) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2019.0001 · Cited by 36
Evolution of coordination in pairwise and multi-player interactions via prior commitments
Ogbo, N. B., Elragig, A., & Han, T. A. (2021) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712321993166 · Cited by 35
Dynamics of collective cooperation under personalised strategy updates
Meng, Y., Cornelius, S. P., Liu, Y., & Li, A. (2024) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-024-47380-8 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Sigmund, K.
- Corresponding author
- Sigmund, Karl
- ORCID
- Sigmund, Karl
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2010-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W3146032046
- Cited by
- 570
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 40 · 2019: 33 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 44 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 46 · 2013: 29 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 43.94
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Economics Books (submittedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- cooperation, selfishness, social dilemmas, evolutionary game theory, reciprocity, reputation, prisoner's dilemma, trust game, ultimatum game, snowdrift game, public goods, social traps, collective action, self-interest
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
