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A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution
Abstract
Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.
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“This proliferation can be explained in terms of evolutionary biology, where payoff is equated with fitness, and relatively higher fitness agents—the free-riders—reproduce faster than others66,67.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [67]
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Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
A construct divided: prosocial behavior as helping, sharing, and comforting subtypes
Dunfield, K. A. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00958 · Cited by 396
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Grand Challenges for Archaeology
Kintigh, K. W., Altschul, J. H., Beaudry, M. C., Drennan, R. D., Kinzig, A. P., Kohler, T. A., Limp, W. F., Maschner, H. D. G., Michener, W. K., Pauketat, T. R., et al. (2014) · American Antiquity · doi:10.7183/0002-7316.79.1.5 · Cited by 319
Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2014) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H.
- ORCID
- Bowles, Samuel
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2011-06-20
- OpenAlex
- W2250536536
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 36 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 32 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 21.95
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Princeton University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Introductory Chapters (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, human cooperation, moral behavior, civic consciousness, social emotions, guilt and shame, norm internalization, institutions, prehistoric warfare, group competition, reciprocity, kin selection
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- Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011). A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution. Princeton University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691151250.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.