Human cooperation
Abstract
Why should you help a competitor? Why should you contribute to the public good if free riders reap the benefits of your generosity? Cooperation in a competitive world is a conundrum. Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work. Five such mechanisms have been proposed: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel selection, and kin selection. Here we discuss empirical evidence from laboratory experiments and field studies of human interactions for each mechanism. We also consider cooperation in one-shot, anonymous interactions for which no mechanisms are apparent. We argue that this behavior reflects the overgeneralization of cooperative strategies learned in the context of direct and indirect reciprocity: we show that automatic, intuitive responses favor cooperative strategies that reciprocate.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
When cooperation between agents (and humans) is possible, better outcomes for all through joint effort are possible.
“When cooperation between agents (and humans) is possible, better outcomes for all through joint effort are possible [27, 39, 40, 63].”
From Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
Sustaining cooperation is an essential problem that enables individuals to achieve better outcomes than they could achieve on their own.
“Sustaining cooperation is an essential problem that enables individuals to achieve better outcomes than they could achieve on their own [63, 66, 68].”
From Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · see citing works
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616 · see citing works
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,416 · see citing works
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04131 · Cited by 2,762 · see citing works
Self-citationAntisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038 · see citing works
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748 · see citing works
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334 · see citing works
Self-citationWilson, D. S. (1975) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.72.1.143 · Cited by 1,259 · see citing works
The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 · Cited by 1,118 · see citing works
Hunter-gatherers and human evolution.
Marlowe, F. W. (2005) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.20046 · Cited by 944 · see citing works
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02978 · Cited by 881 · see citing works
Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?
Bowles, S. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1168112 · Cited by 773 · see citing works
The architecture of human kin detection
Lieberman, D., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05510 · Cited by 748 · see citing works
Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
Fu, F., Hauert, C., Nowak, M. A., & Wang, L. (2008) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.026117 · Cited by 682 · see citing works
Self-citationCooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020140 · Cited by 556 · see citing works
The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350 · see citing works
Self-citationSocial status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment
Seinen, I., & Schram, A. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005 · Cited by 350 · see citing works
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.008 · Cited by 305 · see citing works
Strategy selection in structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Ohtsuki, H., Antal, T., Fu, F., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.03.035 · Cited by 281 · see citing works
Self-citationEvolutionary dynamics in set structured populations
Tarnita, C. E., Antal, T., Ohtsuki, H., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0903019106 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
Self-citationFehl, K., van der Post, D. J., & Semmann, D. (2011) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01615.x · Cited by 220 · see citing works
Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating
Wang, J., Suri, S., & Watts, D. J. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1120867109 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The natural selection of bad science
Smaldino, P. E., & McElreath, R. (2016) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.160384 · Cited by 860 · see citing works
“…of cooperative dilemmas, it might therefore appear that continued contributions to the public good—cooperation rather than free riding—could be maintained through the same mechanisms known to promote cooperation more generally, including reciprocity, monitoring, and punishment (Rand & Nowak, 2013).”
Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness
Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature16981 · Cited by 508 · see citing works
Self-citationHumans display a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally stable
Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms5939 · Cited by 426 · see citing works
Self-citationAtzil, S., Gao, W., Fradkin, I., & Barrett, L. F. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0384-6 · Cited by 415 · see citing works
Locally noisy autonomous agents improve global human coordination in network experiments
Shirado, H., & Christakis, N. A. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature22332 · Cited by 288 · see citing works
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277 · see citing works
Self-citationProsocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy
Nook, E. C., Ong, D. C., Morelli, S. A., Mitchell, J. P., & Zaki, J. (2016) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167216649932 · Cited by 186 · see citing works
Promoting cooperation in the field
Kraft-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., & Rand, D. (2015) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Self-citationInformation gerrymandering and undemocratic decisions
Stewart, A. J., Mosleh, M., Diakonova, M., Arechar, A. A., Rand, D. G., & Plotkin, J. B. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1507-6 · Cited by 176 · see citing works
Wu, J., Balliet, D., Peperkoorn, L. S., Romano, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956 · Cited by 156 · see citing works
Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons
Gächter, S., Kölle, F., & Quercia, S. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0191-5 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
The evolution of trust and trustworthiness
Kumar, A., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0491 · Cited by 148 · see citing works
Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135 · see citing works
Social rewards: From basic social building blocks to complex social behavior
Tamir, D. I., & Hughes, B. L. (2018) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691618776263 · Cited by 109 · see citing works
Open Problems in Cooperative AI
Dafoe, A., Hughes, E., Bachrach, Y., Collins, T., McKee, K. R., Leibo, J. Z., Larson, K., & Graepel, T. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2012.08630 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Sun, W., Liu, L., Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Vasconcelos, V. V. (2021) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Small Groups and Long Memories Promote Cooperation
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep26889 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
Oxytocin promotes intuitive rather than deliberated cooperation with the in-group
Ten Velden, F. S., Daughters, K., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2017) · Hormones and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2016.06.005 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Modern theories of human evolution foreshadowed by Darwin’s <i>Descent of Man</i>
Richerson, P. J., Gavrilets, S., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2021) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aba3776 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Opposing Oxytocin Effects on Intergroup Cooperative Behavior in Intuitive and Reflective Minds
Ma, Y., Liu, Y., Rand, D. G., Heatherton, T. F., & Han, S. (2015) · Neuropsychopharmacology · doi:10.1038/npp.2015.87 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Self-citationKuipers, B. (2018) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3173087 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Learning moral values: Another’s desire to punish enhances one’s own punitive behavior.
FeldmanHall, O., Otto, A. R., & Phelps, E. A. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000405 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Early exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Cooperation, decision time, and culture: Online experiments with American and Indian participants
Nishi, A., Christakis, N. A., & Rand, D. G. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0171252 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Self-citationIndirect Reciprocity and the Evolution of Prejudicial Groups
Whitaker, R. M., Colombo, G. B., & Rand, D. G. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-31363-z · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Self-citationEvolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
Huang, F., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2018) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.04.018 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Santos, F. C., & Trianni, V. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0635 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Cooperate or Collapse: Emergence of Sustainable Cooperation in a Society of LLM Agents
Piatti, G., Jin, Z., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Schölkopf, B., Sachan, M., & Mihalcea, R. (2024) · Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 37 · doi:10.52202/079017-3548 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Ren, T., & Zeng, X.-J. (2024) · Proceedings of the Thirty-ThirdInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.24963/ijcai.2024/22 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
- Authors
- Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Yale University (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-08
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 413-425
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2911795125
- Cited by
- 1,308
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 116 · 2025: 143 · 2024: 109 · 2023: 118 · 2022: 98 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 111 · 2019: 104 · 2018: 100 · 2017: 85 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 73 · 2014: 52 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 29.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- John Templeton Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel selection, kin selection, free-riding, public goods, automated response, laboratory experiments, fieldwork
- MeSH terms
- Choice Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review