Cited by 1,308Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Human cooperation

Rand, David G., Nowak, Martin A.·2013·Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

Why should you help a competitor? Why should you contribute to the public good if free riders reap the benefits of your generosity? Cooperation in a competitive world is a conundrum. Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work. Five such mechanisms have been proposed: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel selection, and kin selection. Here we discuss empirical evidence from laboratory experiments and field studies of human interactions for each mechanism. We also consider cooperation in one-shot, anonymous interactions for which no mechanisms are apparent. We argue that this behavior reflects the overgeneralization of cooperative strategies learned in the context of direct and indirect reciprocity: we show that automatic, intuitive responses favor cooperative strategies that reciprocate.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003

Cites

22 of 22 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • When cooperation between agents (and humans) is possible, better outcomes for all through joint effort are possible.

    “When cooperation between agents (and humans) is possible, better outcomes for all through joint effort are possible [27, 39, 40, 63].”
  • Sustaining cooperation is an essential problem that enables individuals to achieve better outcomes than they could achieve on their own.

    “Sustaining cooperation is an essential problem that enables individuals to achieve better outcomes than they could achieve on their own [63, 66, 68].”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A.
Affiliations
  • Yale University (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Nowak, Martin A.
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-08
Volume
17
Issue
8
Pages
413-425
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2911795125
Cited by
1,308
References
22
Citations by year
2026: 116 · 2025: 143 · 2024: 109 · 2023: 118 · 2022: 98 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 111 · 2019: 104 · 2018: 100 · 2017: 85 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 73 · 2014: 52 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 1
FWCI
29.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
John Templeton Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection, multilevel selection, kin selection, free-riding, public goods, automated response, laboratory experiments, fieldwork
MeSH terms
Choice Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review