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Thought
Abstract
Thoughts and other mental states are defined by their role in a functional system. Since it is easier to determine when we have knowledge than when reasoning has occurred, Gilbert Harman attempts to answer the latter question by seeing what assumptions about reasoning would best account for when we have knowledge and when not. He describes induction as inference to the best explanation, or more precisely as a modification of beliefs that seeks to minimize change and maximize explanatory coherence. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
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Citations
Cited by
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
Fodor, J. A. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00001771 · Cited by 1,485
Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The “Panglossian paradigm” defended
Dennett, D. C. (1983) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00016393 · Cited by 1,046
Thagard, P. (1989) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00057046 · Cited by 1,043
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
TURRI, J. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00331.x · Cited by 446
Coherence as constraint satisfaction
Thagard, P. (1998) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/s0364-0213(99)80033-0 · Cited by 352
Metadata
- Authors
- Harman, G.
- Venue
- Princeton University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2015-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4232758249
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 18.36
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.