Cited by 68Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and Agency

Collective Emotions and Joint Action: Beyond Received and Minimalist Approaches

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Salmela, Mikko, Nagatsu, Michiru·2016·Journal of Social Ontology

Abstract

In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.

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  • In a stock-market meltdown, emotional contagion, behavioral mimicry or similar socio-dynamic processes create an affectively charged situation and result in quasi-collective behavior that eventually harms all shareholders.

    “Now, via emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 2014), behavioral mimicry or similar socio-dynamic processes motivating the individuals’ actions, the individual shareholders’ mass-selling of their own stocks creates an affectively charged situation (a spiral of fear, distrust or ‘collective hysteria’) and results in a quasi-collective behavior, eventually harming all shareholders.”

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Cited by

Authors
Salmela, M., & Nagatsu, M.
Affiliations
University of Helsinki (FI)
Corresponding author
Salmela, Mikko
Venue
Journal of Social Ontology
Published
2016-03-04
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
33-57
ISSN
  • 2196-9655 (ISSN-L)
  • 2196-9663
OpenAlex
W2325635787
Cited by
68
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3
FWCI
3.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Social Ontology (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Princeton University
  • Helsingin Yliopisto
  • University of Cambridge
  • University of Oxford
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
collective emotions, joint action, collective intentionality, coordination, solidarity, interpersonal liking, emotional mechanisms, justification of action

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