Collective Emotions and Joint Action: Beyond Received and Minimalist Approaches
Open accessAbstract
In contemporary philosophy of collective intentionality, emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments do not figure prominently in debates on the explanation and justification of joint action. Received philosophical theories analyze joint action in terms of common knowledge of cognitively complex, interconnected structures of intentions and action plans of the participants. These theories admit that collective emotions sometimes give rise to joint action or more typically, unplanned and uncoordinated collective behavior that falls short of full-fledged jointly intentional action. In contrast, minimalist theorists pay some attention to affective elements in joint action without much concern about their collective intentionality. They refer to an association between low-level synchrony in perceptual, motor, and behavioral processes, and increased interpersonal liking, feelings of solidarity, and cooperativeness. In this paper, we outline an account of collective emotions that can bridge this theoretical divide, linking the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions can function as both motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even without prior joint intentions of the participants. Moreover, they facilitate coordination in joint action.
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In a stock-market meltdown, emotional contagion, behavioral mimicry or similar socio-dynamic processes create an affectively charged situation and result in quasi-collective behavior that eventually harms all shareholders.
“Now, via emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 2014), behavioral mimicry or similar socio-dynamic processes motivating the individuals’ actions, the individual shareholders’ mass-selling of their own stocks creates an affectively charged situation (a spiral of fear, distrust or ‘collective hysteria’) and results in a quasi-collective behavior, eventually harming all shareholders.”
From Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation (2017) · cites this paper as Salmela and Nagatsu (2016)
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Cites
It's All in the Timing: Interpersonal Synchrony Increases Affiliation
Hove, M. J., & Risen, J. L. (2009) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.6.949 · Cited by 1,334 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Phenomenologically, interpersonal affective synchrony gives rise Brought to you by | Kansalliskirjasto Authenticated Download Date | 2/23/18 1:23 PM to mutual feelings of togetherness and rapport (e.g. Hove & Risen 2009; van Baaren et al. 2009; Kirschner & Tomasello 2010; Reddish et al.”
BackgroundSalmela, M. (2012) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2012.647355 · Cited by 120 · cited 2× · see citing works
“For a discussion and critique of the former two, see Salmela (2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 75
- Bacharach, M. (2006): “Beyond Individual Choice”. In: N. Gold and R. Sugden (Eds.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9780691186313Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Bourgois, P. and U. Hess (2008): “The Impact of Social Context on Mimicry”. In: Biological Psychology 77, p. 343–352.10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.11.008Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Brady, M. (2011): “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons”. In: C. Bagnoli, (Ed.): Morality and the Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 135–149.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577507.003.0007Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Branscombe, N. R. and B. Doosje (Eds): (2004): Collective Guilt. An International Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139106931Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Bratman, M. (1992): “Shared Cooperative Activity”. In: The Philosophical Review 101, p. 327–341.10.2307/2185537Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Bratman, M. (1999): Faces of Intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511625190Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Bratman, M. (2009): “Shared Agency”. In: C. Mantzavinos (Ed.): Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 41–59.10.1017/CBO9780511812880.005Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Bratman, M. (2014): Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199897933.001.0001Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Brosch, T. (2014): “Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Attentional Prioritization in Social Interactions”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 78–93.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0006Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Chartrand, T. L. and J. A. Bargh (1999): “The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior Link and Social Interaction”. In: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76, p. 893–910.10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.893Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Collins, R. (2004): Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400851744Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Collins, R. (2014): “Interaction Ritual Chains and Collective Effervescence”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 299–311.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0020Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- D’Arms, J. and D. Jacobson (2000): “Sentiment and Value”. In: Ethics 110, p. 722–748.10.1086/233371Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Decety, J. and M. Meyer (2008): “From Emotion Resonance to Empathic Understanding: A Social Developmental Neuroscience Account”. In: Development and Psychopathology 20, p. 1053–1080.10.1017/S0954579408000503Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Durkheim, E. (2001[1912]): The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. A new translation by C. Cosman. Abridged with an introduction and notes by M.S. Cladis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Ferguson, M. and N. R. Branscombe (2014): “The Social Psychology of Collective Guilt”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 251–265.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0017Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Frijda, N. H. (1986): The Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Frijda, N. H. (2002): “Emotions as Motivational States”. In: European Review of Philosophy 5: Emotion and Action (ed. by E. Pacherie), p. 11–32.Search in Google Scholar
- Gilbert, M. (1989): On Social Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Gilbert, M. (2002): “Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings”. In: Journal of Ethics 6, p. 115–143.10.1023/A:1015819615983Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Gilbert, M. (2003): “The Structure of the Social Atom: Joint Commitment as the Foundation of Human Social Behavior”. In: F. Schmitt (Ed.): Socializing Metaphysics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 39–64.Search in Google Scholar
- Gilbert, M. (2014a): “How we Feel: Understanding Everyday Collective Emotion Ascription”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 17–31.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0002Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Gilbert, M. (2014b): Joint Commitment: How we make the Social World. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199970148.001.0001Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Godman, M., M. Nagatsu, and M. Salmela (2014): “The Social Motivation Hypothesis of Prosocial Behavior”. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44, p. 563–587.10.1177/0048393114530841Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Goldie, P. (2000): The Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Greenspan, P. S. (1988): Emotions and Reasons. London & New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
- Griffiths, P. (2004): “Is Emotion a Natural Kind”? In: R. C. Solomon (Ed.): Thinking about Feeling. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, p. 233–249.Search in Google Scholar
- Halperin, E. (2014): “Collective Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflicts”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 281–295.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0019Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Hatfield, E., J. Cacioppo, and R. Rapson (1994): Emotional Contagion. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139174138Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Helm, B. (2008): “Plural Agents”. In: Nous 42, p. 17–49.10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00672.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Hess, U., S. Houde, and A. Fischer (2014): “Do We Mimic What We See or What We Know”? In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 94–107.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0007Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Huebner, B. (2011): “Genuinely Collective Emotions”. In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1, p. 89–118.10.1007/s13194-010-0006-2Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Jasper, J. J. (2014): “Emotions, Sociology, and Protest”. In: C. von Scheve and M. Salmela (Eds.): Collective Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 341–355.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659180.003.0023Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Kirschner, S. and M. Tomasello (2010): “Joint music Making Promotes Prosocial Behavior in 4-Year-Old Children”. In: Evolution & Human Behavior 31, p. 354–364.10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.04.004Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Knoblich, G., S. Butterfill, and N. Sebanz (2011): “Psychological Research on Joint Action: Theory and Data”. In: Psychology of Learning and Motivation 54, p. 59–101.10.1016/B978-0-12-385527-5.00003-6Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Konzelmann Ziv, A. (2007): “Collective Guilt Revisited”. In: Dialectica 61, p. 467–493.10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01120.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Lambie, J. A. and A. J. Marcel (2002): “Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience: A Theoretical Framework”. In: Psychological Review 109, p. 219–259.10.1037/0033-295X.109.2.219Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Michael, J. (2011): “Shared Emotion and Joint Action”. In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2, p. 355–373.10.1007/s13164-011-0055-2Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Michael, J. and E. Pacherie (2014): “On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action”. In: Journal of Social Ontology 1, p. 89–120.Search in Google Scholar
- Ortony, A., G. Clore, and A. Collins (1988): The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511571299Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Pacherie, E. (2002): “The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action”. In: European Review of Philosophy 5, Emotion and Action (ed. by E. Pacherie), 53–92.Search in Google Scholar
- Pacherie, E. (2011): “Framing Joint Action”. In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2, p. 173–192.10.1007/s13164-011-0052-5Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Pacherie, E. (2013): “Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite”. In: Synthese 190, p. 1813–1839.10.1007/s11229-013-0263-7Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Parker, J. N. and E. J. Hackett (2012): “Hot Spots and Hot Moments in Scientific Collaborations and Social Movements”. In: American Sociological Review 77, p. 21–44.10.1177/0003122411433763Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Parkinson, B., A. Fischer, and A. Manstead (2005): Emotion in Social Relations. New York: The Psychology Press.10.4324/9780203644966Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Pickering, M. J. and S. Garrod (2004): “Toward a Mechanistic Psychology of Dialogue”. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27, p. 169–190.10.1017/S0140525X04000056Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Reddish, P., R. Fischer, and J. Bulbulia (2013): “Let’s Dance Together: Synchrony, Shared Intentionality, and Cooperation”. In: PLoS ONE 8. No. 8, p. e71182.10.1371/journal.pone.0071182Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Richardson, D.C., R. Dale, and N. Z. Kirkham (2007): “The Art of Conversation is Coordination: Common Ground and the Coupling of Eye Movements during Dialogue”. Psychological Science 18, p. 407–413.10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01914.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Rimé, B. (2007): “Interpersonal Emotion Regulation”. In: J. J. Gross (Ed.): Handbook of Emotion Regulation. New York: Guilford, p. 466–485.Search in Google Scholar
- Rizzolatti, G. and L. Craighero (2004): “The Mirror-Neuron System”. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192.10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Roberts, R. (2003): Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Salmela, M. (2005): “Emotional Feelings as Twofold Representations”. In: Å. Carlson (Ed.): Philosophical Aspects of Emotions. Stockholm: Thales, p. 274–295.Search in Google Scholar
- Salmela, M. (2013): “The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups”. In: H.B. Schmid and A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.): Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol. 2. Berlin: Springer, p. 159–176.Search in Google Scholar
- Salmela, M. (2014): “The Rational Appropriateness of Collective Emotions”. In: G.B. Sullivan (Ed.): Understanding Collective Pride and Group Identity London and New York: Routledge, p. 21–33.10.4324/9781315767680-2Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Sanchez Guerrero, H. A. (2013): “Feelings of Being-Together and Caring-With”. In: H.B. Schmid and A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.): Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Vol. 2. Berlin: Springer, p. 177–193.Search in Google Scholar
- Scarantino, A. (2010): “Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions”. In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, p. 729–768.10.1093/bjps/axq011Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Scherer, K. R. (2001): “Appraisal Considered as a Process of Multilevel Sequential Checking”. In: K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (Eds.): Appraisal Processes in Emotion. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 92–120.Search in Google Scholar
- Schmid, H. B. (2009): Plural Action. Essays in Philosophy and Social Science. Contributions to Phenomenology Vol. 58. Berlin: Springer.10.1007/978-90-481-2437-4Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Searle, J. R. (1983): Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Searle, J. R. (1990): “Collective Intentions and Action”. In: P. Cohen, M. Morgan and M. Pollack (Eds.): Intentions in Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 401–415.Search in Google Scholar
- Searle, J. R. (1995): The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Searle, J. R. (2010): Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.001.0001Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Sebanz, N. and G. Knoblich (2009): “Prediction in Joint Action: What, When, and Where”. In: Topics in Cognitive Science 1, p. 353–367.10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01024.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Shockley, K., D. C. Richardson and R. Dale (2009): “Conversation and Coordinative Structures”. In: Topics in Cognitive Science 1, p. 305–319.10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01021.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Stocker, M. (1976): “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”. In: Journal of Philosophy 73, p. 453–466.10.2307/2025782Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tollefsen, D. (2006): “The Rationality of Collective Guilt”. In: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, p. 222–239.10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00136.xSearch in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tollefsen, D. (2014): “A Dynamic Theory of Shared Intention and the Phenomenology of Joint Action”. In: S. R. Chant, F. Hindriks and G. Preyer (Eds.): From Individual to Collective Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 13–33.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199936502.003.0002Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tollefsen, D. and R. Dale, (2012): “Naturalizing Joint Action: A Process-Based Approach”. In: Philosophical Psychology 25, p. 385–407.10.1080/09515089.2011.579418Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tuomela, R. (1995): The Importance of US: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
- Tuomela, R. (2002): The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511487446Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tuomela, R. (2007): The Philosophy of Sociality. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313390.001.0001Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Tuomela, R. (2013): Social Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199978267.001.0001Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- van Baaren, R., L. Janssen, T. L. Chartrand and A. Dijksterhuis (2009): “Where is Love? The Social Aspects of Mimicry”. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364, p. 2381–2389.10.1098/rstb.2009.0057Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- von Scheve, C. and S. Ismer (2013): “Towards a Theory of Collective Emotions”. Emotion Review 5, p. 406–413.10.1177/1754073913484170Search in Google Scholar · DOI
- Vesper, S., S. Butterfill, G. Knoblich and N. Sebanz (2010): “A Minimal Architecture for Joint Action”. Neural Networks 23, p. 998–1003.10.1016/j.neunet.2010.06.002Search in Google Scholar · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Collaborative Irrationality, Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation
Szanto, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02002 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
- Authors
- Salmela, M., & Nagatsu, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Helsinki (FI)
- Corresponding author
- Salmela, Mikko
- Venue
- Journal of Social Ontology
- Publisher
- Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- Published
- 2016-03-04
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33-57
- ISSN
- 2196-9655 (ISSN-L)
- 2196-9663
- OpenAlex
- W2325635787
- Cited by
- 68
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3
- FWCI
- 3.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Journal of Social Ontology (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Princeton University
- Helsingin Yliopisto
- University of Cambridge
- University of Oxford
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- collective emotions, joint action, collective intentionality, coordination, solidarity, interpersonal liking, emotional mechanisms, justification of action
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review