Cited by 120Phenomenology and Existential PhilosophyPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmotions and Moral Behavior

Shared emotions

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Salmela, Mikko·2012·Philosophical Explorations

Abstract

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism…

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Crossref · 10.1080/13869795.2012.647355

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  • Studies of belonging and community formation often emphasize commonality of values, emotions, and feelings.

    “Studies of belonging and community formation often emphasize commonality of values, emotions, and feelings”
  • There is a third dimension of belonging-belonging as a particular kind of member-that shapes the form of these bonds, complicating the idea of collective sociability or togetherness as sameness.

    “However, there is a third dimension of belonging that shapes the form of these bonds, complicating the idea of collective sociability or togetherness as sameness, or as 'a matter of sharing emotions' (Salmela 2012: 42) or feelings (Baffelli and Schr ö er 2021).”

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Authors
Salmela, M.
Affiliations
University of Helsinki (FI)
Corresponding author
Salmela, Mikko
Venue
Philosophical Explorations
Published
2012-03
Volume
15
Issue
1
Pages
33-46
ISSN
  • 1386-9795 (ISSN-L)
  • 1741-5918
OpenAlex
W4233059252
Cited by
120
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4
FWCI
6.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Philosophical Explorations (publishedVersion)
  • Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
Keywords
shared emotions, collective emotions, Margaret Gilbert, phenomenology of emotion, feeling rules

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