Shared emotions
Open accessAbstract
Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism…
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Studies of belonging and community formation often emphasize commonality of values, emotions, and feelings.
“Studies of belonging and community formation often emphasize commonality of values, emotions, and feelings”
From Feeling Apart: Relations of Belonging in Tibetan Buddhist Lay-Monastic Communities (2021) · cites this paper as Salmela 2012
There is a third dimension of belonging-belonging as a particular kind of member-that shapes the form of these bonds, complicating the idea of collective sociability or togetherness as sameness.
“However, there is a third dimension of belonging that shapes the form of these bonds, complicating the idea of collective sociability or togetherness as sameness, or as 'a matter of sharing emotions' (Salmela 2012: 42) or feelings (Baffelli and Schr ö er 2021).”
From Feeling Apart: Relations of Belonging in Tibetan Buddhist Lay-Monastic Communities (2021) · cites this paper as Salmela 2012: 42
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BackgroundElectrodermal activity measurement within a qualitative methodology
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Pernau, M. (2017) · The Indian Economic & Social History Review · doi:10.1177/0019464616683477 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
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BackgroundThe Expression of Hate in Hate Speech
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“I rejoice because of our winning, and as Salmela has put it, “this pronominal qualifier must be taken quite literal” (Salmela, 2012, p. 43).”
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Emotions in Philosophy. A Short Introduction
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Emotions and social reflection in being and developing as a university teacher
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“With regard to socially sharing experiences and emotions in this study, we do not mean collective or group-based emotions (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Salmela, 2012; Smith & Mackie, 2016; Smith et al., 2007), but rather sharing individually experienced emotions in social reflection with significant others as to how to b…”
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“Salmela (2012) confirms that these are similarities that contribute to the formation of a shared emotion and adds the similarities concerning physiological changes, action-tendencies, and the fundamental concerns of the participants.”
Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action
Heinonen, M. (2015) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393115614533 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
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Puusepp, V. (2023) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2171858 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“In recent years, several philosophical accounts of shared emotions have been offered (see e.g., Gilbert, 2002, 2014; Guerrero, 2016; Krueger, 2013; León & Zahavi, 2019; León et al., 2017; Michael, 2016; Salmela, 2012; Schmid, 2014, 2015; von Scheve & Salmela, 2014).”
InfluentialCollective emotional dynamics: Perspectives for marketing
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Going Together: Toward an Account of Sharing Aesthetic Experiences
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“…concern of indignation can be described as a concern for the right understood as an attachment to the respect of superior common goods.14 In the OGVA case, the relevant ‘collectively shared concern’ (Salmela, 2012) for the modification of the charter was ‘respect for others’, as the charter shows.”
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“However, some scholars argue that convergent individual emotions based on shared appraisals are not sufficient for collective emotions, which, as emotions of a collective, instead require mutual awareness and a joint affective experience (Salmela 2012; Thonhauser 2022).”
We and us: The power of the third for the first‐person plural
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“…group and individual emotions were expected to be indicated by emotional language referencing a wider collective, such as attributions to “we” or “us” or expressed in a manner suggestive of collectively owned emotion (León & Zahavi, 2018; Salmela, 2012; Salmela & Nagatsu, 2016; Tuomela, 2013).”
BackgroundThe joy of movement in physical education: the enfleshed body
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“Further, the findings imply that shared emotions in movement can exist, and be exhibited in friendships (Salmela, 2012).”
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Hindriks, F. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780197815182.001.0001 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Ecological Grief as a Shared Emotion
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Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework
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“In the case of group-based emotions, we might speak of diachronic social extension, which might come in various degrees depending on the collectivity of the underlying concern (Salmela, 2012).”
Valuation on financial markets: Calculations of emotions and emotional calculations
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“Shared interpretations of these and other events culminate in the experience and expression of similar emotions, both in terms of the synchronization of emotion and in terms of shared emotions in a strong ‘we-intentional’ sense (Salmela, 2012).”
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Laitinen, A. (2024) · Australasian Philosophical Review · doi:10.1080/24740500.2024.2485531 · Cited by 2
First Steps in an Epistemology of Collective Intellectual Self-Trust
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“Salmela emphasizes that the three types of groups most probably form a continuum rather than a distinct set of either-or-options (2012), so it is not much of a surprise that some groups might be a mixture of forms of collectivity.”
Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust 1
Kassar, N. E. (2022) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/phis.12228 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Les émotions peuvent-elles être collectives ?
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“Cette intention partagée des participants – un alignement de leurs concerns (Salmela 2012) focalisé sur le rite lui-même – se traduit concrètement par les obligations réciproques qui les engagent les uns vis-à-vis des autres et qui sont mises au service du bon déroulement de leur performance…”
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Schwenkenbecher, A. (2024) · Business Ethics the Environment & Responsibility · doi:10.1111/beer.12756
“…to acknowledge that in this article, I cannot do justice to the large and growing literature on collective emotions in philosophy and other disciplines such as psychology and sociology (Brady 2016; Huebner 2011; Salmela 2012; Schmid 2014; Seger, Smith, and Mackie 2009; von Scheve and Salmela 2014).”
Salice, A. (2024) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2023.2299757 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
“Hence, joint attention and shared emotions are closely linked and this link has often been highlighted in the literature (Hobson, 2002; Salmela, 2012).”
Entre Nous: Charles Taylor’s Social Ontology
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“Take the example (discussed by Scheler 1954, Schmid 2009 and Salmela 2012) of parents’ joint grief over their lost child.4 This is a strong example suggesting that there can be one token emotion, one token experience, had by two individuals together.”
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Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity
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“…von Scheve and Salmela 2014) and numerous philosophers (e.g., Gilbert 2002, 2014; Tollefsen 2006; Konzelmann Ziv 2007, 2009; Helm 2008, 2017; Schmid 2009, 2014; Huebner 2011; Michael 2011; Salmela 2012, 2014; Salmela and Nagatsu 2016a, 2016b; Krueger 2014, 2015; Szanto 2015, 2018; León et al.”
Distrust, Inc.: Interpersonal and Corporate Distrust, Ordinary and Deep
Szanto, T. (2026) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-026-10543-1
Repetition in Action: Søren Kierkegaard and the Problem of Human Agency in the Anthropocene
Thaler, M. (2025) · Political Theory · doi:10.1177/00905917251398784
“98 So, the idea behind recovering Kierkegaard for the debate around the climate emergency is not to sideline or denigrate rival approaches that focus on the complexity of coordinated, joined-up responses.”
The Appropriateness of Political Emotions
Szanto, T., & Tietjen, R. R. (2025) · Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.7968
“These political emotions proper are a subset of shared emotions (Salmela 2012; Szanto 2015) and characterized by four features (Szanto and Slaby 2020; Osler and Szanto 2021).”
Les dynamiques émotionnelles collectives. Perspectives pour le marketing
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Collective Moods. A Contribution to the Phenomenology and Interpersonality of Shared Affectivity
Trcka, N. (2017) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9934-9
“23 See for example Barbalet and Demertzis 2013, p. 176 (on emotional climate); Salmela 2012; SanchézGuerrero 2011.”
BackgroundThe Moral Agency of Group Agents
Thompson, C. (2017) · Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9901-7
“So it is possible for member agents to believe 25 Mikko Salmela (2012) notes that Gilbert’s joint commitment account seems to provide a ‘feeling rule’ for group emotions, rather than group emotions per se.”
BackgroundMoved by Masses? Shared Moods and Their Impact on Immoral Behavior
Weber‐Guskar, E. (2017) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9838-8 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Gilbert denies that there is at least some difference that one should 14 Carefully discussed in Salmela 2012, 34 ff. accommodate.”
BackgroundPutting Plural Self-Awareness into Practice: The Phenomenology of Expert Musicianship
Salice, A., Høffding, S., & Gallagher, S. (2017) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2
“It is generally agreed that “sharedness” of emotions come in degrees and that it is accompanied by a sense of us-ness (Salmela 2012).”
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“…construction of these discourses.1 We use the term ‘transmission of emotions’ instead of the widely used term ‘sharing of emotions’ (Smith et al., 2007; Salmela, 2012, 2014) to indicate that we treat emotional experience not only as an internal state of mind that people come to share with each…”
MethodCollective emotion and the function of expressive behaviour
Price, C. (2016) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316275672.006
“Instead, he sets out to develop a robust notion of shared emotion, entirely compatible with emotional individualism (Salmela, 2012: 44).”
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How Autonomous Are Collective Agents? Corporate Rights and Normative Individualism
Hindriks, F. (2014) · Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9629-6
“In light of this, we have reason to believe that it makes sense to hold collective agents morally 17 Another possible substitute consists of corporate or shared emotions that do not require corporate consciousness (see Gilbert 2002, 2006; Schmid 2008, and Salmela 2012).”
Background
- Authors
- Salmela, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Helsinki (FI)
- Corresponding author
- Salmela, Mikko
- ORCID
- Salmela, Mikko
- Venue
- Philosophical Explorations
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 33-46
- ISSN
- 1386-9795 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-5918
- OpenAlex
- W4233059252
- Cited by
- 120
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 12 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 6.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Philosophical Explorations (publishedVersion)
- Työväentutkimus Vuosikirja (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Keywords
- shared emotions, collective emotions, Margaret Gilbert, phenomenology of emotion, feeling rules
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