Cited by 25Kantian Philosophy and Modern InterpretationsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryCriminal Law and Policy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 27 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Kant on Capital Punishment and Suicide

Open access
Ataner, Attila·2006·Kant Studien

Abstract

In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant clearly, and indeed ardently, upholds the state's right to impose the death penalty in accordance with the law of retribution ( ius talionis ). The “principle of equality” as between crime and punishment demands that those who wrongfully kill another should be put to death, for, in having inflicted such an evil upon another, the murderer has effectively killed himself. Kant is quite emphatic on this point: those who have committed murder “must die ”. Here, he argues, “there is no substitute that will satisfy justice”, for there “is no similarity between life, however wretched it may be, and death, hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer […]”. The ius talionis is, for Kant, the basic principle and measure in accordance with which criminal justice functions. Since the ius talionis entails a strict equality between crime and punishment, Kant's insistence that only the death penalty serves as the appropriate response to murder (or to any other equally egregious crime) is fairly straightforward.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that Kant’s own prohibition on suicide, grounded in the irrationality of willing the annihilation of the autonomous will, undermines his endorsement of capital punishment. It contends that capital punishment is formally equivalent to suicide and cannot be rationally willed by a co-legislator in the original contract.

Key findings

  • The author argues that practical reason cannot sanction the deliberate killing of a human being: as self-legislating will (*Wille*), practical reason cannot posit its own annihilation without contradiction, so capital punishment is irrational within Kant’s framework.
  • Kant’s distinction between *homo noumenon* as pure rational legislator and *homo phaenomenon* as criminal fails, because execution extinguishes the autonomous will; if embodiment is a precondition of moral agency, the death of the criminal also destroys the self-legislating subject.
  • The criminal retains “innate personality” and some capacity for rational agency, losing only “civil personality”; Kant’s retributivism requires a voluntary act and forbids treating the criminal as a mere thing, so capital punishment cannot be rationally consented to by a politically autonomous citizen.
  • Capital punishment is not coercion in the Kantian sense: coercion targets *Willkür* and presupposes the continued existence of the subject, whereas execution eliminates the subject and reaches inner freedom/*Wille*. Kant’s reply to Beccaria therefore does not answer Beccaria’s question.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis of Kant’s texts, including the *Metaphysics of Morals*, *Lectures on Ethics*, *Groundwork*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Toward Perpetual Peace*, alongside secondary literature such as Beccaria, Rawls, Hill, Merle, and Dyke.
  • The paper reconstructs Kant’s arguments on suicide, self-punishment, autonomy, right, coercion, and punishment, then tests whether capital punishment can be consistently derived from those premises.
  • No empirical sample or quantitative analysis is used; the argument is normative and interpretive.

Limitations

  • The paper states that Kant remains silent on how the duty against suicide could be overridden by conflicting grounds of obligation and does not resolve the casuistical questions he invokes.
  • It acknowledges that Rawls’s interpretation of possible exceptions poses a difficulty, and that the argument would fall apart if self-punishment were rational or if Merle’s reading of the criminal were correct; the author argues against both.
  • The author notes a controversial issue he cannot pursue—whether immoral action is free or autonomous—and admits a “narrow and restrictive reading” of the coercion–punishment connection; the argument also depends on “assuming Dyke’s interpretation is correct.” Evident from the text: the conclusions rest on interpretive premises rather than empirical evidence.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1515/kant.2006.028

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

64 Own interpretation · 31 No basis given · 19 Sources not found · 4 No full text of the sources · 2 Not checked yet

Show all 76 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 27
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 23
44 of 44
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There is a conceptual interconnection between practical reason, the universal will, the principle of right, and the idea of the original contract.

    “These questions presuppose that there is a conceptual interconnection between”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Punitive provisions are indispensable in civil society, so punishment as such is not merely an arbitrary end.

    “We have accepted that punitive provisions are indispensable in civil society, so that punishment as such is not some merely arbitrary end.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Physical embodiment, i.e., continued living, is an essential precondition of moral agency; homo noumenon can exist in this world only insofar as it is also physically instantiated as homo phaenomenon.

    “If physical embodiment, i.e., continued living, is an essential precondition of moral agency -if homo noumenon can exist in this world only in so far as it is also physically instantiated as homo phaenomenon”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Life is an essential precondition of the possibility of any judgement.

    “given that life is an essential precondition of the possibility any judgement”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The state's application of force in punishment is rational.

    “the other is supposed to be a rational application of force on the part of a state agency”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Human subjects have a natural aversion to being punished and will avoid sanctions by complying with the law.

    “the human subject can be expected to have a natural aversion to being punished and will avoid sanctions by complying with the law”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Coercion presupposes weakness of Willkür, such that it may be affected in such a way as to induce compliance with right.

    “That is, coercion presupposes weakness of Willkür, that it may be affected in such a way as to induce compliance with right.”
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Metadata

Authors
Ataner, A.
Corresponding author
Ataner, Attila
Venue
Kant Studien
Published
2006-01-01
Volume
97
Issue
4
ISSN
  • 0022-8877 (ISSN-L)
  • 1613-1134
OpenAlex
W2036773832
Cited by
25
References
7
Citations by year
2024: 18 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 2
FWCI
5.41
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Kant-Studien (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Law and Policy
Keywords
Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, death penalty, suicide, retribution, principle of equality, murder, criminal justice

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